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Articles
WHISTLEBLOWING ATTORNEYS AND
ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURES
ALEX B. LONG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The lament is an all-too-common one.  New attorneys arrive at
their law firms and find little to no guidance from senior attorneys.1
They are given tasks they are not fully prepared to handle alone and
left to sink or swim.2  The result, all too often, is incompetent
representation.3
Copyright  2009 by Alex B. Long.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.  Thanks to Ted
Schneyer, Carl Pierce, Anthony Davis, and Andrew Perlman for their helpful comments on
an earlier draft and to the participants at the Third Annual Colloquium on Current Schol-
arship in Labor & Employment Law, especially Tim Glynn.  Thanks to Peter Ferrell for his
research assistance on this Article.  Thanks also to Will Kittrell and Michelle Gilbert for
their assistance.
1. See Paul H. Burton, What Money Can’t Buy: Organic Mentoring in Law Firms, 43 ARIZ.
ATT’Y 12, 13 (2007) (“Organic, mano a mano mentoring is all but extinct in today’s frenetic
legal environment.”); Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satis-
faction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239,
281–83 (2000) (addressing the decline of mentoring at firms); Elizabeth K. McManus, In-
timidation and the Culture of Avoidance: Gender Issues and Mentoring in Law Firm Practice, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 217, 220 (2005) (noting the particular problem of lack of mentoring
for female attorneys); Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite
Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 724–25
(1998) (noting the isolation many new attorneys experience in their firms); James Regan,
Note, How About a Firm Where People Actually Want To Work?: A “Professional” Law Firm for the
Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2693, 2706 (2001) (stating that African-American
associates often cite the lack of mentoring as a reason for leaving a law firm).
2. See In re Yacavino, 494 A.2d 801, 803 (N.J. 1985) (per curiam) (“In the future . . .
this attitude of leaving new lawyers to ‘sink or swim’ will not be tolerated.”).
3. See, e.g., Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, Ribicoff & Kotkin, 717 A.2d
724, 730 (Conn. 1998) (affirming a malpractice verdict against an associate for the associ-
ate’s failure to seek out supervision and noting the associate’s defense that she “‘as-
sume[d] somebody was . . . watching, taking care of looking at my work’” (alteration in
original)); In re Weston, 442 N.E.2d 236, 238, 240 (Ill. 1982) (disciplining supervising attor-
ney for failing to supervise a subordinate attorney who ignored a matter assigned to him to
the detriment of the client); In re Yacavino, 494 A.2d at 802, 804 (suspending junior attor-
ney from the practice of law for three years for forging documents to cover his negligent
handling of a matter); In re Barry, 447 A.2d 923, 926 (N.J. 1982) (Clifford, J., dissenting)
(placing part of blame for young attorney’s malpractice on law firm’s failure to provide
regular supervision); In re Myers, 584 S.E.2d 357, 360–61 (S.C. 2003) (per curiam) (disci-
plining supervising prosecuting attorney for failure to supervise deputy who had failed to
786
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This type of hands-off management style may have other conse-
quences.  A law firm that takes little interest in the professional devel-
opment of its junior attorneys is likely to also be a law firm that lacks a
culture of ethical practice.  Where incompetence is tolerated, it is
likely that other types of unethical practices are ignored and tacitly
condoned.  Unfortunately, where a firm lacks an ethical infrastruc-
ture, an attorney may lack any place to turn when the attorney ob-
serves unethical practices on the part of another attorney or faces a
difficult ethical dilemma himself or herself.4  The absence of any
meaningful internal policies or mechanisms to which a subordinate
attorney can turn in such instances places the attorney in a difficult
position.  The attorney can ignore any ethical concerns he may have,
thereby contributing to the cycle of unethical practice within the firm
and the legal profession at large, or the attorney can raise concerns
with others either inside or outside the firm.  The problem with the
latter course of action is that such action may expose the “whistleblow-
ing” attorney to retaliation by the law firm and loss of employment.5
Rule 5.1 of the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) requires law firm partners to
make reasonable efforts to supervise subordinate attorneys and to en-
sure that the firm has internal measures in place that give “reasonable
assurance” that all lawyers within the firm are complying with their
ethical obligations.6  Despite the existence of these ethical duties,
there is relatively little data regarding law firm compliance measures.7
However, there are certainly enough judicial decisions involving attor-
neys who have been fired for blowing the whistle on unethical con-
provide defense counsel with relevant information); Fortney, supra note 1, at 282–83
(“Without mentoring, associates struggle to learn how to practice law competently and
ethically.”); see also Lewis v. State Bar of Cal., 621 P.2d 258, 261–62 (Cal. 1981) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring) (stating that the burden of the duty of competence “appears to fall dispropor-
tionately on younger members of the legal profession who begin their careers as solo prac-
titioners”); Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Law Firm Associates, 45
BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 212–13 (2007) [hereinafter Richmond, Professional Responsibilities] (not-
ing the unwillingness of courts to excuse associates’ incompetence when it results from
lack of supervision).
4. The term “ethical infrastructure” is most closely associated with Professor Ted
Schneyer. See Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10
(1991) (stating that “a law firm’s organization, policies, and operating procedures consti-
tute an ‘ethical infrastructure’”).
5. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities, supra note 3, at 247.
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a), (b) (2008).
7. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 119, 131 (2005) [hereinafter Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy] (noting that
very little data exist on the “prevalence of compliance specialists” within law firms).
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duct8 and anecdotes from law firm associates about the internal
pressures within law firms to look the other way when confronted with
ethical issues9 to lead one to suspect that perhaps law firm compliance
measures in this regard leave something to be desired.  As impor-
tantly, despite the duties present in Model Rule 5.1, the reality is that
law firm partners presently face little risk of disciplinary action for
their failure to develop meaningful ethical infrastructures.10
The failure of the legal profession to do more to require law firms
to develop ethical infrastructures that encourage the reporting, inves-
tigation, and resolution of internal reports of unethical conduct and
to protect attorneys from retaliation when they report unethical con-
duct stands in marked contrast to the current trend in other areas of
the law.  In the employment discrimination field, the Supreme Court
of the United States has interpreted federal law broadly in order to
protect employees from retaliation when they complain about unlaw-
ful discrimination.11  The major federal employment discrimination
statutes provide protection from retaliation for internal as well as ex-
ternal whistleblowers, and in some cases the Court has held that em-
ployers are prohibited from retaliating against employees who engage
in protected whistleblowing activity even when the anti-discrimination
statute in question affords no explicit protection from retaliation.12
In addition, the Court has given employers a strong legal incentive to
8. See generally Alex B. Long, Retaliatory Discharge and the Ethical Rules Governing Attor-
neys, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1043 (2008) [hereinafter Long, Retaliatory Discharge] (detailing
cases).
9. See Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems and
Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 178 (2005) (quoting associate as saying “I know
that my colleagues regularly falsely elevate their time entries”).
10. See infra notes 106–115 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1936–37, 1943 (2008) (holding that
the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act proscribes retali-
ation against employees for filing age discrimination complaints); CBOCS West, Inc. v.
Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954–55 (2008) (holding that the “equal contract rights” pro-
vision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 1981, encompasses complaints of retaliation); Bur-
lington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 63–64 (2006) (finding that the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not limited in scope to
harms related to employment).
12. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 129 S. Ct. 846, 849 (2009) (holding that Title VII’s
anti-retaliation provision  protects employees who answer questions as part of an em-
ployer’s internal investigation into a charge of harassment); Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at
1935–36 (holding that Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibited employer from
retaliating against federal employee who filed an administrative complaint of age discrimi-
nation despite the absence of a statutory anti-retaliation provision); CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct.
at 1954–55, 1957–58, 1961 (holding that § 1981 prohibited employer from retaliating
against employee who complained to managers about race discrimination despite the ab-
sence of a statutory anti-retaliation provision); see also Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note
8, at 1085–86 (discussing Title VII’s protection for those who report wrongdoing internally
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adopt internal reporting and investigation procedures that allow em-
ployees to report suspected unlawful discrimination by granting em-
ployers an affirmative defense that sometimes allows employers to
avoid liability for harassment committed by supervisors.13  Similarly, in
the corporate law world, there have been major changes in federal law
in recent years requiring publicly traded corporations to develop
more formal ethical infrastructures and to adopt procedures to en-
courage internal reports of wrongdoing.14
Yet, the legal profession, for whatever reasons, has chosen not to
follow suit.  The Model Rules do not speak directly to the issue of
whistleblower protection for attorneys who report unethical conduct
to disciplinary authorities.  In addition, it appears that law firms have
made only modest attempts to encourage firm attorneys to report sus-
pected wrongdoing internally.  In the summer of 2008, I conducted a
survey of law firms regarding the measures they have taken to ensure
that all attorneys within their firms are practicing in an ethical man-
ner in accordance with Rule 5.1.15  Of the 156 responding firms, only
15% reported that they had a written policy encouraging attorneys to
notify someone within the firm about suspected unethical conduct on
the part of another attorney.
as well as those who file formal discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission).
13. See infra notes 304–305 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 281–282 and accompanying text.
15. The survey was a regional one, focusing on Tennessee.  The survey was distributed
to 710 law firms in the cities with the highest populations in the state:  Memphis, Nashville,
Knoxville, Chattanooga, Murfreesboro, Clarksville, and the Tri-Cities area (Bristol, King-
sport, and Johnson City).  Initially, an attempt was made to distribute the survey to an
appropriate individual at every law firm in Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville, and Chatta-
nooga—by far the four largest cities in the state—by using information contained in the
Tennessee Attorney’s Directory or available online.  Eventually, I also attempted to dis-
tribute the survey electronically to an appropriate individual at law firms in Murfreesboro,
Clarksville, and the Tri-Cities area in order to provide a more representative sample of the
state.  The survey consisted of thirteen questions that respondents could answer online at a
secure site.  When e-mail addresses were available, the survey was distributed by e-mail.  I
later sent out a follow-up letter and survey by mail to the same individuals.  Where e-mail
addresses were not available, the survey was distributed by mail.  One hundred fifty-six
firms responded, making the response rate 22%.  Like most surveys which are confined to
a particular market, the most significant drawbacks to this survey are its small sample size
and its confinement to one legal market.  For example, the percentage of respondents
from law firms consisting of over 100 attorneys was 4.5%, a higher percentage than exists
on a national level (.7%) according to a 2000 American Bar Foundation study. CLARA N.
CARSON, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN
2000, at 30 (2004).  Because that 4.5% consists of only seven law firms, however, it would
obviously be unwise to draw any firm conclusions about the ethical infrastructures that
exist more generally on a nationwide basis.
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The legal profession prides itself on the role it plays in the admin-
istration of justice and the fact that it is a self-governing profession.16
A profession that is truly serious about protecting those it serves from
the harmful consequences of unethical conduct would adopt a system
that would hold employers accountable when they have failed to
adopt reasonable measures designed to prevent and detect potentially
harmful conduct.  It would also promote the most efficient means of
bringing misconduct to light and afford protection to those who do
so.  Currently, the legal profession does none of those things.  There-
fore, this Article will advocate for a change.  More specifically, this
Article will examine the duty of law firm partners to help ensure that
lawyers within the firm are engaged in the ethical practice of law and
the plight of would-be whistleblowers when firm partners fail to live
up to this duty.
Part II will discuss the role that a law firm’s ethical infrastruc-
ture—or lack thereof—may have on encouraging attorneys to make
internal and external reports of suspected unethical conduct and the
various reasons why attorneys (and particularly junior attorneys) often
fail to make such reports.  Part III will discuss the scope of a law firm
partner’s ethical obligations to help develop internal structures to en-
courage such reporting and the various shortcomings of the current
ethical structure regarding the reporting of suspected professional
misconduct and the protection of whistleblowing lawyers.  Part III also
will relate the results of the 2008 survey of law firms concerning their
attempts to comply with Rule 5.1 and to encourage the internal re-
porting of unethical conduct.  Part IV will offer several suggestions as
to how the legal profession could do more to encourage law firms to
promote the ethical practice of law while protecting would-be
whistleblowers.  In addition to proposing several interpretations of ex-
isting ethical rules, this Part will look to developments in the corpo-
rate and employment discrimination law fields in suggesting the
addition of several new ethical rules to encourage attorneys to make
internal reports of suspected unethical conduct and to protect those
attorneys who make internal and external reports of suspected unethi-
cal conduct.
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., cl. 6 (2008) (“As a public citizen, a
lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration
of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession.”); id. cl. 11, 12 (not-
ing the self-governing nature of the legal profession and stating that “[a]n independent
legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law”).
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II. ETHICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND WHISTLEBLOWING ATTORNEYS
A. The Influence of a Firm’s Ethical Infrastructure on Individual
Attorneys
The explanations for incompetent and unethical lawyering are
limitless.  One recurring theme, however, is that the culture and struc-
ture of a law firm may have a profound influence on the professional
ethics of its individual lawyers.  In 1991, Professor Ted Schneyer fa-
mously advanced the proposition that a law firm’s “ethical infrastruc-
ture”—its “organization, policies, and operating procedures”—may be
at least as likely to be the cause of unethical conduct and professional
malpractice as “the individual values and practice skills” of the attor-
neys who make up the firm.17  In other words, the failure of a firm to
develop internal mechanisms that help prevent, identify, and root out
unethical practices may permit such practices to flourish.
The increasing complexity of not just the law in general but also
the law governing lawyers makes it difficult for even experienced law-
yers to always understand their ethical responsibilities.18  But the lack
of adequate internal mechanisms within a law firm to address poten-
tial ethical problems may have particular consequences for newer law-
yers.  It is now almost an article of faith among law school graduates
that legal education does an inadequate job of preparing young law-
yers for the “real world” of the practice of law.19  And it is almost an
equally common refrain that law firms do a poor job of supervising
and instructing new attorneys on the practice of law.20  As an example,
Professor Susan Saab Fortney cites the failure of law firms to provide
training on billing matters, an area obviously fraught with potential
17. Schneyer, supra note 4, at 10.
18. See Anthony E. Davis, Legal Ethics and Risk Management: Complementary Visions of Law-
yer Regulation, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 115 (2008) (stating that “law school graduates
who have taken a basic professional responsibility course and who have passed the MPRE
generally have only the most basic understanding of” legal ethics); Jonathan M. Epstein,
The In-House Ethics Advisor: Practical Benefits for the Modern Law Firm, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1011, 1029 (1994) (“While every lawyer has an obligation to be familiar with the current
ethical rules in his or her jurisdiction, this becomes practically impossible, especially if
resources are not readily available.”).
19. See Amy B. Cohen, The Dangers of the Ivory Tower: The Obligation of Law Professors to
Engage in the Practice of Law, 50 LOY. L. REV. 623, 630 (2004) (explaining responses to a
survey revealing that practicing lawyers believed most frequently that legal education
should do more to prepare students for the practical aspects of law practice); Lisa G.
Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 681 (1990) (“Most new lawyers realize that
there is a wide gulf between what they learn in their ethics classes and what happens in the
world of practice.”).
20. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR403.txt unknown Seq: 7 17-JUN-09 10:19
792 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68:786
ethical peril.21  According to Fortney’s 2000 survey of law firm associ-
ates, only 14% of respondents indicated that they received more than
two hours of training on billing matters and 26% reported that they
received no training whatsoever.22  It is not just in the area of training
on billing that the ethical infrastructure of some law firms may be
lacking.  Less than half of the respondents to Fortney’s survey re-
ported that their firms had written billing guidelines, and roughly a
quarter replied that they did not know whether their firms had written
guidelines.23
Professors Elizabeth Chambliss and David B. Wilkins have de-
voted significant time to studying the ethical infrastructures of law
firms,24 and they generally find firms wanting.  Professor Chambliss
concludes:
[R]esearch suggests that most law firms do a relatively poor
job of monitoring firm-wide compliance with professional
regulation.  For instance, while most firms have formal pro-
cedures for identifying conflicts of interest, many firms lack
formal procedures for addressing other ethical issues, such
as lawyers’ investment in clients’ businesses and the with-
drawal of client funds.25
Anecdotally, numerous decisions recount the tales of newer attor-
neys left to navigate difficult ethical waters with little to no supervision
from supervising attorneys.26  Of course, in some instances, the cases
involve young attorneys whose moral compasses may already have
been defective.  In such cases, the failure of any meaningful compli-
ance policies or procedures within the firm simply made it possible for
the attorneys’ incompetent and unethical practices to go undetected.
But it is not difficult to imagine situations in which a newer attorney,
21. Fortney, supra note 1, at 253–54.
22. Id. at 254 & n.87.
23. Id. at 253.
24. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastruc-
ture in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 (2002)
[hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure] (providing an
example of Professors Chambliss and Wilkins’s research and analysis of the “ethical infra-
structure” within law firms).
25. Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 127–28.
26. See, e.g., In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162, 1166 (D.C. 2004) (involving a law firm in
which “there was no system in place to impart rudimentary ethics training to lawyers in the
firm, particularly the less experienced ones” and the “lack of a review mechanism which
allowed an associate’s work to be reviewed and guided by a supervisory attorney”); Ky. Bar
Ass’n v. Weinberg, 198 S.W.3d 595, 596–97 (Ky. 2006) (involving an attorney who dele-
gated a case to another attorney, who allowed the statute of limitations to run and then
delegated the case to a subordinate attorney); supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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left alone and with no guidance, confronts a difficult issue and in
good faith tries, but fails, to act in a competent and ethical manner.
The failure of a law firm to adopt any meaningful policies or pro-
cedures to encourage the ethical practice of law may have broader
consequences.  Over time, organizations develop their own cultures,
which may shape the values of those within the organization.27  At the
beginning of a lawyer’s career in a law firm, it is natural to look to
others to develop a sense of the prevailing norms within the organiza-
tion.28  Recent law school graduates in particular look “up and
around” in order to learn what is expected of them.29  And, as Profes-
sor Lisa G. Lerman has suggested, these new associates may not be
particularly critical of the ethical norms they are expected to mirror
given their desire to succeed within the firm.30
Drawing upon social psychology research, Professor Andrew Perl-
man has recently argued persuasively that many of the situational fac-
tors that contribute to conformity in terms of decision-making are
present in the practice of law.31  Perlman defines “conformity” among
professionals in terms of the suppression of “independent judgment
in favor of a group’s opinion” and the lack of “resistance in the face of
illegal or unethical demands.”32  One factor associated with such con-
formity is the extent to which an ethical issue contains ambiguity and
uncertainty.  Legal ethics questions are often laden with ambiguity
and, even when they are not, no one is as capable of “identifying (or
manufacturing)” ambiguity as a lawyer.33  Accordingly, Perlman con-
cludes that “lawyers are especially susceptible to the forces of conform-
ity,” including organizational structures in which superiors hold long-
term power over subordinates (such as the power firm partners pos-
sess over the career prospects of associates) and the lack of social sta-
tus among subordinates, who are more likely to conform to protect
27. See, e.g., Christine Parker et al., The Ethical Infrastructure of Legal Practice in Larger Law
Firms: Values, Policy and Behaviour, 31 U.N.S.W. L.J. 158, 163–64 (2008) (“Research demon-
strates that bureaucratic corporate structures influence the ethical vision of those within
them.”); Milton C. Regan Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
941, 942 (2007) (discussing how an organizational culture shapes individual values).
28. Lerman, supra note 19, at 681.
29. Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principle of Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM.
L. REV. 631, 643 (2005).
30. Lerman, supra note 19, at 681.  Professor Kimberly Kirkland has argued that large-
firm lawyers are even more likely to adopt the norms of other firm attorneys than are
attorneys in mid-sized and smaller law firms because large-firm attorneys spend much of
their careers doing work for many different attorneys.  Kirkland, supra note 29, at 637.
31. Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social
Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451, 451–52 (2007).
32. Id. at 453.
33. Id. at 460.
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their vulnerable positions.34  This may be particularly true in mid-
sized and larger law firms where junior lawyers often work in teams
under the supervision of a partner.35  Not surprisingly then, the reali-
ties of law firm practice may contribute strongly to the lack of inde-
pendent decision-making and dissent among junior attorneys.
B. Internal Procedures for Reporting Misconduct and Whistleblowing
Attorneys
Then, Paul realized how futile all this was. What were his
choices?  He could confront Calvin Morris, the best litigator at Stuy-
vesant & Main.  As he thought about it, he realized that the conver-
sation was a non-starter.  Paul couldn’t even imagine having the
nerve to open his mouth.  And what words would he utter? “Sir, you
lied yesterday in court.” . . . All speeches Paul could conjure ended
with the same result: Paul’s prompt departure from the firm.
Nor was there anyone else with whom he could talk.  The client
had never even met Paul.  Going to another partner was too intimi-
dating and, in any event, hopeless.  Here was Paul, recently celebrat-
ing his thirtieth birthday and still required to call all partners by
their last name . . . .  No partner at Stuyvesant & Main would
break ranks to side with an associate.  Not on a question like this.36
The failure of a law firm to develop a meaningful ethical infra-
structure may, as a practical matter, mean that professional miscon-
duct will often go unreported.  A lawyer who observes another lawyer’s
misconduct faces a difficult problem.  According to Model Rule
8.3(a), “[a] lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a law-
yer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional author-
ity.”37  There are any number of reasons why a lawyer might be
disinclined to report the misconduct of another lawyer to disciplinary
authorities.  The lawyer might not “know”—a term denoting actual
knowledge under the Model Rules38—that the other lawyer has en-
gaged in the conduct in question.  In other instances, the lawyer may
34. Id. at 460–61.
35. See Parker et al., supra note 27, at 168 (“[W]here a team works closely together on a
day-to-day basis it can be very difficult for individuals to step outside of that shared culture
and question the ethics of a particular practice or decision . . . .”); Schneyer, supra note 4,
at 8 (“Many, perhaps most, of the tasks performed in large firms are assigned to teams.”).
36. Lawrence J. Fox, I’m Just an Associate . . . at a New York Firm, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 939,
950 (2000).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2008) (emphasis added).
38. Id. R. 1.0(f).
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be unsure as to whether the conduct in question amounts to an ethi-
cal violation at all, let alone one that raises a substantial question
about the other lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.  These are concerns that
could potentially be addressed within a law firm through resort to
some type of internal process, such as referral to an ethics counsel or
committee charged with the responsibility of investigating such mat-
ters.39  In the absence of such a mechanism, however, an attorney may
be left without guidance and may all too quickly conclude that the
matter is not worth pursuing.
Aside from such rule-based reasons for not reporting misconduct,
many lawyers are reluctant to blow the whistle on other lawyers for
both practical and philosophical reasons.  The general public has
somewhat mixed feelings about whistleblowers, and the legal profes-
sion, with the value it places on maintaining confidences, perhaps
takes a particularly dim view of such individuals.40  But these types of
pressures may be exacerbated by the absence of any type of ethical
infrastructure to deal with reporting issues.  This may be especially
true for more junior attorneys, who may reasonably view the lack of
any policy addressing the reporting of unethical conduct as a strong
signal that such reports—particularly where they concern more senior
attorneys—are unwelcome.  Many large law firms at least now have
designated ethics attorneys or committees to deal with ethics ques-
tions; however, in at least some firms, the designated individuals view
their assignments as a distraction from the actual practice of law.41  In
one survey, when asked about the role of a firm’s ethics committee, a
respondent referred to the committee as the “no business commit-
tee.”42  Thus, some firms appear to do little more than pay lip service
to the notion of developing an ethical infrastructure.  Where such is
the case, a law firm may, in the words of one author, “convey the sym-
bolic message that ethical consultation is just one step above napping
at one’s desk” in terms of career advancement for associates.43
The lack of such internal procedures for the handling of sus-
pected misconduct may be significant in terms of bringing the mis-
conduct to light.  One recent empirical study suggests that employees
39. See Epstein, supra note 18, at 1029 (discussing the benefits of legal ethics specialists
or committees within law firms).
40. See Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at 1045–46 (explaining how
whistleblowing lawyers “face pressures unique to the practice of law”).
41. Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 128–29.
42. Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The Everyday Ethics of
Defense Litigators, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 743 (1998).
43. Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate
Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 864 (1998).
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prefer an internal reporting option to an external reporting one, at
least where the employee believes that the internal report is likely to
produce an appropriate response.44  Whistleblowers of all stripes rec-
ognize the possibility that they may be retaliated against by their em-
ployers and ostracized by their coworkers.45  But, according to at least
one study, external whistleblowers are more likely to face these conse-
quences than are internal whistleblowers.46  Therefore, as rational ac-
tors, attorneys—and particularly junior attorneys, who work in firms
without any type of meaningful internal reporting procedure—can
frequently be expected to do nothing in the face of unethical
conduct.
A young lawyer’s natural inclination toward inaction is likely only
intensified when the lawyer scans the legal landscape involving other
attorneys who have reported the misconduct of other attorneys.  At
the state level, protection for whistleblowers varies dramatically from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  The majority of state statutes affording
protection for whistleblowers protect external whistleblowers who re-
port to government agencies but not those who make an internal re-
port of wrongdoing.47  Some jurisdictions have been willing to
recognize a common law claim of wrongful or retaliatory discharge in
violation of public policy for whistleblowers; however, once again, ex-
ternal whistleblowers often fare better than internal whistleblowers in
such claims.48  In addition to concerns about overburdening employ-
ers by creating too many exceptions to the employment at-will rule,
courts sometimes rely on the somewhat specious argument that there
is no public interest at stake in the case of an employee who is dis-
charged for having reported illegal or unethical conduct to the em-
ployer rather than a public agency.49
Closer to home, if a lawyer who is contemplating making a report
of another lawyer’s unethical conduct happens to look at cases involv-
44. Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping Obliga-
tions, 97 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 28), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1114924.
45. See Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark?  Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the
Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1053 (2004)
(relating results of study finding that 82% of whistleblowers studied experienced harass-
ment after blowing the whistle and that “many whistleblowers develop serious mental ill-
ness, such as depression”).
46. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protect-
ing the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 301–02
(1991).
47. Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 14–15).
48. Id. (manuscript at 13).
49. Id. (manuscript at 14).
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ing whistleblowing lawyers, the lawyer may be even less inclined to
make the report.  In numerous instances, lawyers have been fired after
having reported the misconduct of another lawyer to disciplinary au-
thorities, having raised the possibility of doing so, or having raised
concerns over misconduct internally within a firm.50  There are a
good number of such cases, and the results are even more unpredict-
able than in cases of non-lawyer whistleblowers.51  Although some
courts have recognized these claims, whistleblowing lawyers who pur-
sue legal action after being discharged may nonetheless face poten-
tially significant obstacles.  For instance, some attorneys have had
success on a contract theory, arguing that adherence to the rules of
professional conduct is an implied term of any lawyer’s employment
and that discharging an attorney for attempting to comply with the
duty to report misconduct constitutes a breach.52  Although poten-
tially useful for some plaintiffs, this approach is of somewhat limited
value because it only applies when the reporting attorney is complying
with an ethical duty to report misconduct.  An attorney who merely
“does the right thing” absent any express duty would be unprotected
from retaliation as a contractual matter.53  As discussed in greater de-
tail below, however, there is arguably no ethical duty to raise concerns
about or make a more formal report of misconduct internally within a
firm.  Thus, an attorney who is contemplating making an internal re-
port of ethical misconduct is unlikely to find much solace in the con-
tractual approach.54
In the tort context, some courts have relied on the special confi-
dentiality rules and other ethical obligations facing lawyers in refusing
outright to recognize the retaliatory discharge claim of a whistleblow-
50. See generally Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at 1049–50 (categorizing these
types of cases).
51. See id. at 1049–62 (summarizing the results of such cases); see also Anthony E. Davis,
Professional Responsibility, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 2006 (describing associate’s retaliation claim
based upon his refusal to engage in unethical conduct); Mary Pat Gallagher, Difrancesco
Former Partner Ratchets Up Suit Against Firm, N.J.L.J., Apr. 2, 2008 (describing whistleblower
retaliation suit brought by former nonequity firm partner).
52. See, e.g., Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 109 (N.Y. 1992) (finding implied obliga-
tions under the Code of Professional Responsibility in the contractual relationship be-
tween lawyers).
53. See Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at 1077–78 (noting that under the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine, an employer is free to discharge an employee at any time and for
any reason).
54. It should be noted that where the attorney’s report carries with it some express or
implied threat to make a formal external report to disciplinary authorities, the attorney’s
contract claim may be more likely to succeed. See Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 106 (permitting
such a claim where attorney insisted that the law firm report the misconduct of another
attorney to disciplinary authorities).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR403.txt unknown Seq: 13 17-JUN-09 10:19
798 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68:786
ing lawyer or placing limitations on such claims.55  As may be the case
in a contract claim, a lawyer’s retaliatory discharge claim might be
barred because of the absence of an affirmative ethical duty to make
an internal report of wrongdoing.56  In addition, an internal
whistleblowing lawyer may confront a jurisdiction’s refusal to recog-
nize internal whistleblower claims more generally.57
Even when a jurisdiction has a whistleblower statute, the
whistleblowing attorney may be left without protection for other rea-
sons.  In Snow v. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A.,58 for
example, an associate was discharged after informing state authorities
that a partner had diverted funds from his former law firm, allegedly
in violation of the jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct.59  The
Florida appellate court held that the associate had no claim under the
state’s whistleblower statute because that statute only protected an in-
dividual who had reported a violation of a “law, rule, or regulation” to
a government agency; according to the court, Florida’s Rules Regulat-
ing the Florida Bar did not qualify, despite their designation as
“rules.”60
In short, bringing misconduct to light carries with it the potential
for retaliation.  In contrast, the choice to remain silent in the face of
unethical behavior carries relatively few risks for an attorney.  An at-
torney will often have no express duty to make an internal report of
misconduct.61  And attorneys are rarely disciplined for their failure to
report another lawyer’s misconduct externally pursuant to Rule 8.3.62
For many attorneys, the choice between reporting and keeping silent
is, as a practical matter, quite simple.
55. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503–04 (Cal. 1994)
(stating that in-house counsel’s retaliatory discharge claim must be dismissed if satisfying
the elements of the claim requires breaching the attorney-client privilege); Jacobson v.
Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 493–94 (Ill. 1998) (holding that law firm attor-
ney’s obligation to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct cannot “be the foundation for
a claim of retaliatory discharge”); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108 (Ill. 1991)
(refusing to extend the tort of retaliatory discharge to cover in-house counsel because of
the attorney-client privilege).
56. See Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 884 (D.C.
1998) (barring such a claim because the attorney “failed to demonstrate the existence of a
legal obligation to report to her superiors the improper conduct which she claims to have
observed”).
57. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.
58. 896 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
59. Id. at 789–90.
60. Id. at 791.
61. See infra notes 90–96 and accompanying text.
62. See Perlman, supra note 31, at 475 (explaining that Rule 8.3 is “rarely enforced”).
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The general reluctance of lawyers to raise concerns about an-
other lawyer’s misconduct has potentially serious consequences, how-
ever.  Because of the nature of their jobs, attorneys are in the best
position to observe and recognize unethical behavior on the part of
other attorneys.63  As such, they are in perhaps the best position to
protect current and future clients from unethical behavior.  If law-
yers—either out of fear of being perceived as “snitches” or out of fear
of being fired—are reluctant to notify others who are in position to
address misconduct, the public’s interest in an ethical legal profession
is jeopardized.
III. RULE 5.1 AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE INTERNAL
WHISTLEBLOWER SCENARIO
The Model Rules recognize the importance of law firms develop-
ing ethical infrastructures.  In various ways, the Model Rules require
law firm partners and those with managerial authority to try to ensure
that attorneys within the firm are practicing in an ethical manner.
However, there are several gaps in the current structure that limit the
effectiveness of the Model Rules in dealing with the difficult problem
of the attorney who must decide whether to make a report of ethical
wrongdoing by another attorney.
A. Rule 5.1 and Ethical Infrastructures
Model Rule 5.1 describes the supervisory duties of law firm part-
ners and other superiors.  The rule establishes three separate, but in-
ter-related, standards concerning an attorney’s responsibility for the
ethical practices of other attorneys within the firm.  Under Rule
5.1(a), a partner or an individual attorney with managerial authority
in a law firm has a duty to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
firm develops internal policies and procedures designed to promote
compliance with the ethical rules.64  Rule 5.1(b) is similar in scope,
but speaks directly to the individual relationship between a supervis-
ing attorney and a subordinate attorney.  The rule imposes a duty on
the supervising attorney to “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”65  Fi-
nally, Rule 5.1(c) describes the situations in which a lawyer may be
held responsible for the ethical transgressions of another lawyer.66
63. Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A
Roadmap for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 265 & n.21 (2003).
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2008); id. R. 5.1 cmt. 3.
65. Id. R. 5.1(b).
66. Id. R. 5.1(c).  Specifically, Rule 5.1(c) provides as follows:
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Although each part of Rule 5.1 addresses the supervisory respon-
sibilities of attorneys within a firm, Rule 5.1(a) focuses most directly
on forcing firms to develop “ethical infrastructures” that will en-
courage ethical practices within the firm.67  Rule 5.1(a) provides,
A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or to-
gether with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial
authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to en-
sure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable
assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.68
As an obvious example, a law firm should have some procedures in
place to detect prohibited conflicts of interest.69  However, Rule
5.1(a) also plainly covers the spectrum of potential ethical violations,
including competency and handling of client funds.70
Importantly, the scope of a partner’s duty under Rule 5.1(a) does
not depend on whether another attorney in the firm has actually com-
A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law
firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over
the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can
be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
Id.  Under Rule 5.1(c), a lawyer is responsible for another lawyer’s violation of an ethical
rule if, among other situations, the lawyer “knows of the conduct at a time when its conse-
quences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.” Id.
Because the Model Rules define the terms “knows” or “knowledge” in terms of actual
knowledge, id. R. 1.0(f), Rule 5.1(c) would seem to excuse a law firm attorney with mana-
gerial authority who did not “know” of a subordinate attorney’s misconduct due to the law
firm’s failure to have in place any policy or procedure designed to detect such misconduct.
An ABA Formal Ethics Opinion, however, takes the position that an attorney who lacks
such knowledge due to the attorney’s violation of Rule 5.1(a)’s duty to supervise may none-
theless face discipline for the other attorney’s misconduct.  ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 03-429, at 3 (2003); see also Arthur J. Lachman, What You
Should Know Can Hurt You: Management And Supervisory Responsibility for the Misconduct of
Others Under Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3, 18 PROF. LAW. 1, 2 (2007) (analyzing the ABA
opinion).
67. Schneyer, supra note 4, at 17.
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a).
69. See id. R. 1.7 cmt. 3 (“To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer
should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and prac-
tice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation matters the persons and issues
involved.”).
70. Id. R. 5.1 cmt. 2; see Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of
Attorneys’ Supervisory Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 259, 268 (1994) (discussing the way that
Rule 5.1 requires supervision of attorneys’ duty of competency).
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mitted an ethical violation.71  Nor does it matter that a partner lacked
direct supervisory authority over an attorney who committed an ethi-
cal violation or lacked knowledge of the violation.72  Indeed, as one
court has observed, a partner’s lack of knowledge might actually help
establish a violation of the rule.73  What matters for purposes of Rule
5.1(a), according to the comments, is whether a partner has made
“reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures de-
signed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”74
Despite imposing a duty to make “reasonable efforts” to en-
courage firm-wide compliance procedures, Rule 5.1(a) stops short of
defining that duty with any degree of specificity.  The comments ex-
plain that, as is the case with tort law’s “reasonable person” standard,
what constitutes a reasonable effort to ensure compliance varies with
the structure and nature of the firm’s practice.75  “In a small firm of
experienced lawyers,” the comments explain, “informal supervision
and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordina-
rily will suffice.”76  In larger firms or firms with sophisticated practices,
“more elaborate measures may be necessary.”77  Such measures might
include establishing “a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make
confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated se-
nior partner or special committee.”78  Commentators have suggested
other possible compliance measures that might help satisfy this duty,
including the establishment of a mentoring program or a legal or eth-
ics counsel.79  The limited case law on the subject suggests that the
71. See Miller, supra note 70, at 279 (“[F]ailure to make reasonable preventative efforts
theoretically subjects every partner to professional discipline . . . regardless of any miscon-
duct at all.”).  The comments clarify that the duty under Rule 5.1(a) applies not just to
traditional law firm partners, but to others with similar managerial authority in other set-
tings, such as the law department of a government agency. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 1; see also In re Myers, 584 S.E.2d 357, 362 (S.C. 2003) (per curiam)
(concluding that the rule applies to attorneys in government agencies).
72. In re Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.2d 10, 14–15 (S.C. 2001); see
Miller, supra note 70, at 279 (acknowledging that attorneys can violate the rule “regardless
of the partner’s remoteness from the violating attorney” or “the partner’s knowledge or
suspicion of any misconduct”).
73. In re Anonymous Member, 552 S.E.2d at 15.
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 2.
75. Id. cmt. 3.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Lachman, supra note 66, at 6.  The regulations accompanying the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2006) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.), contain a similar
requirement.  Supervisory attorneys must make “reasonable efforts” to ensure that
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failure to have some type of review mechanism in place by which a
supervisor may review an associate’s work may also give rise to a viola-
tion of Rule 5.1(a).80
B. The Gap in Coverage
Despite the broad scope of Rule 5.1(a), there are numerous fac-
tors that work to limit its overall effectiveness in encouraging firms to
develop a culture of ethical practice.  Most obvious is the fact that the
rule’s “reasonable efforts” standard does not require law firm partners
to establish any particular measures that firm lawyers should follow to
guide them in their day-to-day practice or in the case of questionable
ethical conduct.  Other factors also work to create something of a gap
in the coverage of the Model Rules when it comes to lawyers who sus-
pect that another attorney is engaged in unethical conduct.
1. The Absence of Ethical Rules Regarding Internal Reporting of
Misconduct
The Model Rules do not specifically require a law firm to estab-
lish a procedure for handling internal reports of ethical misconduct.
Nor, except in limited circumstances, do the Model Rules speak di-
rectly to the internal handling of an ethical dilemma within a law firm.
Rule 8.3(a) imposes an affirmative obligation on the part of a lawyer
who knows of another lawyer’s serious misconduct to make an exter-
nal report of the unethical conduct to appropriate disciplinary au-
thorities.81  While an attorney who knows that another attorney has
engaged in misconduct “that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other re-
spects” must report out to disciplinary authorities,82 nothing in the
Model Rules imposes a duty on the part of such an attorney to first
notify others within the attorney’s law firm, despite the fact that it
might obviously be in the interests of all parties concerned.83
subordinate attorneys conform to the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations.  17 C.F.R. § 205.4(b)
(2008).  Like the Model Rules, the regulations do not elaborate on what is meant by the
term “reasonable efforts.”
80. See, e.g., In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162, 1166 (D.C. 2004) (finding a law firm’s lack of
an attorney review mechanism “troubling”).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a).
82. Id.
83. At least one bar association ethics opinion has suggested that such a duty should be
imposed.  See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Op. 82-79 (1982) (stating that it is desira-
ble that an associate raise a matter of possible professional misconduct involving a partner
within the firm before reporting to disciplinary authorities).
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The closest the Model Rules come to addressing such situations
directly is Rule 5.2, which describes the duties of subordinate attor-
neys.  Under Rule 5.2, a subordinate attorney remains responsible for
the attorney’s own ethical violation, despite the fact that the
subordinate attorney was acting at the direction of a supervising attor-
ney.84  The subordinate attorney may avoid discipline, however, when
she acts in accordance with a supervising attorney’s “reasonable resolu-
tion of an arguable question of professional duty.”85  The comments
explain that where an ethical question is “reasonably arguable,” the
subordinate attorney “may be guided” by the supervising attorney’s
reasonable resolution of the matter.86  Therefore, one might plausibly
argue that because the rule contemplates a dialogue between the
subordinate and supervising attorneys, the rule presupposes a duty on
the part of a subordinate to raise any concerns about the propriety of
an action with her supervisors within the firm.
To date, however, no court that has considered such an argument
has accepted the idea that Rule 5.2 imposes any type of affirmative
duty on the part of a subordinate attorney to report questionable ethi-
cal conduct internally.  In Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom,87 the D.C. Court of Appeals rejected an associate’s argument
that implicit in Rules 5.1 and 5.2 was an obligation to report to her
superiors within a law firm the improper conduct of other attorneys
she claimed to have observed.88  Accordingly, the court rejected her
claim of wrongful discharge based on the theory that she had been
retaliated against for having reported such conduct internally.89  The
court opined that not only do the rules not expressly impose a duty
upon a subordinate attorney to report misconduct to superiors within
the firm, “on their face, the two Rules appear to have nothing to do
with any such claimed obligation.”90
In other situations, a firm attorney may have a duty to notify
others within the firm about possible misconduct.  Those situations,
however, are fairly limited.  Under Rule 5.1(c)(2), for example, a part-
ner or supervising attorney is responsible for the misconduct of an-
other attorney if the partner or supervising attorney knew of the
misconduct but failed to take reasonable remedial action in time to
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2(a).
85. Id. R. 5.2(b) (emphasis added).
86. Id. R. 5.2 cmt. 2.
87. 715 A.2d 873 (D.C. 1998).
88. Id. at 884.
89. Id. at 883–84.
90. Id. at 884.
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avoid or mitigate the consequences.91  Logically, reasonable remedial
action might include notifying others within the firm of the miscon-
duct so that appropriate action can be taken.92  On its face, however,
the rule applies only to partners (or those with comparable manage-
rial authority) and attorneys with direct supervisory authority, not
more junior attorneys.  One could also argue that a lawyer’s duty of
competence would compel the lawyer to notify someone of another law-
yer’s misconduct that might adversely affect a client.93  And in light of
confidentiality concerns, the most likely someone in such a case would
be another attorney in the same law firm.  However, even if a success-
ful argument could be made that the duty of competence requires
internal reporting of ethical misconduct, the scope of such a duty
would be limited.  Because the duty of competence is one owed to a
lawyer’s client, a lawyer might only have a duty to make an internal
report when the lawyer was involved in the representation of the ad-
versely affected firm client.94  In other instances, it might be consis-
tent with a lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the law firm as an employee to
notify the firm of misconduct that might negatively impact the firm.95
But in terms of express disciplinary rules, the Model Rules are gener-
ally silent on the specific issue of internal reporting of misconduct.96
2. The Absence of Ethical Rules Prohibiting Retaliation
The absence of any explicit duty on the part of a law firm or its
partners to establish an internal reporting mechanism or on the part
of subordinate attorneys to make an internal report of questionable
ethical conduct is noteworthy because no other ethical rule specifi-
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(c)(2).
92. See Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at 1051–52 (discussing internal
whistleblowing).
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client.”); see also id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer should . . . take whatever
lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”).
94. See id. R. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.” (empha-
sis added)).
95. See Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1263, 1265 (Mass. 1989) (explaining
that law firm partners owe each other fiduciary duties and that “‘[e]mployees occupying a
position of trust and confidence owe a duty of loyalty to their employer and must protect
the interests of their employer’” (alteration in original) (quoting Chelsea Indus., Inc. v.
Gaffney, 449 N.E.2d 320, 326 (Mass. 1983))); Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 8)  (“[A]
loyal employee must view the good of the organization as a whole and behave according to
what is best for the future of the corporation.”).
96. Rule 1.13 sometimes requires a lawyer who represents a corporate client to report
unlawful conduct on the part of a person associated with the organization up the corporate
ladder. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b).  However, the rule only requires a
lawyer to report such misconduct to the client, not to the lawyer’s employer.
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cally prevents retaliation when an associate makes such an internal
report.97  Moreover, no ethical rule explicitly prohibits a lawyer or law
firm from retaliating against an attorney who makes an external re-
port of misconduct to disciplinary authorities pursuant to Rule 8.3.98
As the case law attests, the internal whistleblower may face retaliation
from the employing law firm.99  Yet, no Model Rule prohibits such
action expressly.100  As discussed in greater detail later, interference
with or hindrance of the disciplinary process may amount to conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice.101  But it does not appear
that any court has yet extended these principles to the situation in
which an attorney is threatened or fired after having, internally, raised
the possibility of making a formal disciplinary complaint about an-
other attorney.102
97. See infra Part IV.A.1 and accompanying text.
98. See infra Part IV.A.1 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.  In some cases, the attorney is part of
a traditional law firm. See, e.g., Kelly v. Hunton & Williams, No. 97-CV-5631, 1999 WL
408416, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1999) (involving a law firm associate who was forced to
resign after raising questions to firm management about partner’s supposed overbilling);
Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ill. 1998) (reviewing a case in
which a law firm associate who was fired for reporting the firm’s illegal practices to a princi-
pal partner of the firm); Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. 1998)
(involving a law firm partner who was discharged after raising concerns about billing prac-
tices to the firm’s managing partner).  In others, the attorney is employed by a corpora-
tion. See, e.g., Heckman v. Zurich Holding Co. of Am., 242 F.R.D. 606, 608 (D. Kan. 2007);
Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 876 P.2d 487, 490 (Cal.
1994); O’Brien v. Stolt-Nielson Transp. Group, Ltd., 838 A.2d 1076, 1079 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 2003); Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 652 A.2d 578, 581 (Del. Ch. 1994); GTE
Products Corp. v. Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161, 163 (Mass. 1995); Nordling v. N. States Power
Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 499–500 (Minn. 1991); Considine v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 551
S.E.2d 179, 180–81 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001); Parker v. M&T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215,
217–18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878,
879–80 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); see also Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at 1050 n.40
(noting and summarizing cases).  Regardless of whether a lawyer works for a traditional law
firm or the legal department of a corporation, the Model Rules treat the lawyer as working
for a “firm.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(c).
100. Rule 1.13(e) addresses the issue of retaliatory discharge in a limited sense.  Under
the rule, one who “reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the
lawyer’s” decision to report client misconduct up the ladder of the client’s corporate struc-
ture should inform “the organization’s highest authority” about the lawyer’s discharge. Id.
R. 1.13(e).  The rule does not, however, provide any protection from retaliation in the first
place.  Moreover, in the case of a law firm attorney, the rule does not prohibit the law firm
from retaliating against the reporting attorney.
101. See infra notes 166–175 and accompanying text.
102. Some courts have treated an employer’s decision to fire the internal whistleblowing
attorney before the attorney has a chance to file a formal disciplinary complaint as a form
of anticipatory retaliation and recognized a wrongful discharge cause of action. See
Matzkin v. Delaney, Zemetis, Donahue, Durham & Noonan, P.C., No. CV044000288S, 2005
WL 2009277, at *1, *4–*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 19, 2005) (upholding the attorney’s cause
of action for wrongful discharge based on the law firm’s termination of employment after
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3. The Other Weaknesses of Rule 5.1
The absence of ethical rules requiring internal reporting of sus-
pected misconduct or prohibiting retaliation against internal or exter-
nal whistleblowers is significant because of the added strain it places
on Rule 5.1.  The gaps in the rules in this respect create a concomi-
tant need for law firm partners to have effective measures in place that
attorneys can utilize in the event of an ethical dilemma.  Unfortu-
nately, as currently enforced, Rule 5.1 does not appear to be fully up
to the task.
Depending upon the size of the firm or the stature of the individ-
ual partner within the firm, the ability of an individual partner to ef-
fectuate change may be quite limited as a practical matter.  Law firms
continue to rely on multi-tiered partnership structures in which non-
equity partners sometimes lack management and decision-making au-
thority.103  Accordingly, some partners have little practical ability to
influence a firm’s creation of an ethical infrastructure.  In addition,
the further removed an individual partner is from another lawyer’s
misconduct, the greater the likelihood that disciplinary authorities
will be reluctant to charge the partner with failing to make efforts to
supervise the other attorney pursuant to Rule 5.1(b).104  And because
Rule 5.1, as written, does not impose vicarious responsibility upon
partners for the ethical violations of other attorneys,105 partners may
have less incentive to take an active role in matters having no direct
bearing on their situation.
In addition to these shortcomings, the absence of disciplinary
opinions involving Rule 5.1 suggests that the rule is under-enforced.
There are relatively few disciplinary cases involving violations of Rule
learning of the attorney’s intent to report misconduct); Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105,
106, 110 (N.Y. 1992) (same); see generally Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation
Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 983–84
(2007) [hereinafter Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend] (discussing the theory of anticipatory
retaliation).
103. See William D. Henderson, An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Partner-
ships in the Am Law 200, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1694 (2006) (detailing the rise of multi-tiered
partnership structures); Robert W. Hillman, Law, Culture, and the Lore of Partnership: Of
Entrepreneurs, Accountability, and the Evolving Status of Partners, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793,
821 (2005) (describing the multi-tiered structure of a law firm in which non-equity part-
ners “did not participate in firm governance, apparently had no management authority,
and presumably lacked the means or authority for monitoring the activities of equity
partners”).
104. See Miller, supra note 70, at 292–93 (speculating as to reluctance of disciplinary
officials to impose sanctions for such “‘innocent’ acts of omission”).
105. In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.2d 10, 12 (S.C. 2001) (per curiam).
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5.1.106  The typical case in which Rule 5.1 is implicated involves what
Professor Irwin D. Miller described as situations involving “blatant lack
of supervisory efforts,”107 in which a law firm’s partners have made
virtually no attempts to ensure that firm attorneys are practicing in an
ethical manner.108 In re Yacavino,109 for example, involved an associ-
ate who was suspended from the practice of law for forging a court
order to conceal his negligent handling of an adoption.110  In keeping
with Rule 5.2, the fact that the associate had, in the court’s words,
been “left virtually alone and unsupervised” in a law firm of twenty
attorneys was no excuse for the associate’s misconduct.111  While disci-
plining the attorney, the court also referenced the failure of the part-
ners to live up to their duties as partners under Rule 5.1, and put law
firms and their partners on notice that “this attitude of leaving new
lawyers to ‘sink or swim’ will not be tolerated.”112
One likely reason for the lack of disciplinary decisions involving
Rule 5.1 is that firm lawyers are the most likely source of complaints.
Yet, firm lawyers (or even former lawyers) are, for the reasons dis-
cussed previously,113 unlikely to ever file a complaint about the lack of
106. See Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 126 (describing Rule 5.1(a) as a
“disciplinary ‘dead letter’” due to its lack of enforcement); Epstein, supra note 18, at 1015
(describing the “dearth of bar opinions or cases” on the subject of “what constitutes ‘rea-
sonable efforts’ by partners to ensure” compliance with the Model Rules); Miller, supra
note 70, at 285 (referring to the lack of disciplinary cases).  For example, according to the
Office of the General Counsel of the State Bar of Alabama, from September 1992 to De-
cember 2006, there were only thirteen violations of Rule 5.1.  Alabama State Bar, Petition
to Amend the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct app. at 13-13, http://www.alabar.
org/ogc/PDF/Petition_A_filed_Supreme_Court%20Oct12_2007.pdf (last visited May 19,
2009).  In contrast, there were 636 violations of the rule relating to neglect of a client
matter and 518 violations of the rule relating to communication with a client. Id.
107. Miller, supra note 70, at 285–86.
108. See, e.g., In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162, 1166 (D.C. 2004) (involving a law firm in
which “there was no system in place to impart rudimentary ethics training to lawyers in the
firm, particularly the less experienced ones” and the “lack of a review mechanism which
allowed an associate’s work to be reviewed and guided by a supervisory attorney”); In re
Weston, 442 N.E.2d 236, 239 (Ill. 1982) (involving an attorney who assigned a matter to an
associate but was unable to supervise the associate due to “his duties and extensive travels
as president of a national association” over a period of a few years); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Wein-
berg, 198 S.W.3d 595, 597 (Ky. 2006) (involving an attorney who delegated a case to an-
other attorney, who allowed the statute of limitations to run and who then delegated the
case to a subordinate attorney); In re Barbare, 602 S.E.2d 382, 383 (S.C. 2004) (involving a
partner in a two-person law firm whose inadequate accounting system allowed for several
instances of criminal fraud).
109. 494 A.2d 801 (N.J. 1985) (per curiam).
110. Id. at 802, 804.
111. Id. at 802–03.
112. Id. at 803.
113. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text (discussing conformity within law
firms).
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supervision or ethical infrastructures within a firm.  As an example,
over three years, one state disciplinary agency reported a total of
twenty-six complaints of failure to supervise non-lawyers in violation of
Rule 5.3 (the majority of which presumably came from the non-law-
yers in question), but exactly zero complaints regarding the failure to
supervise subordinate lawyers under Rule 5.1(b).114  Yet, the opportu-
nity for enforcement still exists.  As Professor Miller has noted,
“[a]rguably, every case of professional discipline, other than cases
against sole practitioners, raises the question of whether reasonable
(preventive) measures (Rule 5.1(a)) were in effect and whether rea-
sonable (preventive) efforts (Rule 5.1(b)) were made.”115  Thus, virtu-
ally every case presents the chance to publicize and to promote the
goals underlying Rule 5.1.
The lack of decisional law has meant that the scope of a partner’s
duties under Rule 5.1 (and 5.1(a) in particular) remains largely unde-
fined.  It seems clear that in virtually all situations, regardless of firm
size or practice complexity, the failure to utilize a mechanism to re-
view the work of at least junior attorneys should constitute a violation
of Rule 5.1(a).116  But how much further must a firm go in order to
comply?  In one instance, the D.C. Court of Appeals, although stop-
ping short of imposing an affirmative duty under Rule 5.1(a), criti-
cized a relatively small firm (twelve attorneys) for its failure to have a
“system in place to impart rudimentary ethics training to lawyers in
the firm, particularly the less experienced ones.”117  Although Rule
5.1(a)’s “reasonable efforts” standard makes it difficult to establish
bright-line rules, is this the type of minimal compliance effort that
virtually any firm should be expected to undertake?  Without more
decisions involving Rule 5.1, the contours of the rule remain largely
undefined.
114. See Annual Report of the Lawyer Disciplinary Board, W. VA. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2007, at 30
(reporting eight complaints for failure to supervise non-lawyers filed in 2006); Lawyer Disci-
plinary Board Report, W. VA. LAW., May/June 2006, at 34 (reporting nine complaints for
failure to supervise non-lawyers filed in 2005); Report to the Board of Governors from Lawyer
Disciplinary Board, W. VA. LAW., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 32–33 (reporting nine complaints for
failure to supervise non-lawyers filed in 2002).
115. Miller, supra note 70, at 285.
116. See generally In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162, 1163, 1166–67 (D.C. 2004) (finding a Rule
5.1(c) violation for similar inaction in a firm of twelve attorneys).
117. Id. at 1163, 1166.
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C. What Law Firms Do in Practice
1. Existing Studies of Law Firm Compliance Procedures
There have been a number of studies in the past decade touching
on the question of how law firms develop and maintain ethical infra-
structures.  In addition to inquiring about law firm billing practices,
Professor Fortney’s 2000 study of law firm associates explored the ex-
tent to which law firms had systems or policies “for dealing with ethi-
cal concerns of attorneys” in place.118  Her results suggest that ethical
infrastructures are not as robust and widely used in the law firm set-
ting as one might expect in light of the obligations that Rule 5.1 im-
poses.  Only 54% of respondents replied that their firms did have such
measures in place, with 22% reporting the absence of such measures
and 24% indicating that they did not know if any kind of system or
policy was in place.119  Large firms were more likely to have formal
systems—such as the existence of an ethics committee or scheduled
ethics training—in place than were small and mid-sized firms.120
One frequently discussed option for resolving the myriad profes-
sional responsibility issues that can arise in a law firm is the use of an
in-house ethics advisor.121  The structure and responsibilities of such
positions may vary widely,122 but it is clear that the position of an in-
house ethics expert is now fairly common at larger law firms.  A 2002
study of large law firms by Professors Elizabeth Chambliss and David
B. Wilkins revealed that each of the thirty-two responding firms had at
least one partner with “special responsibility for promoting ethics
and/or regulatory compliance.”123  According to a 2004 survey con-
ducted by consulting group Altman Weil, nearly two-thirds of re-
sponding law firms in the AmLaw 200 had a designated general
118. Fortney, supra note 1, at 254.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 255 tbl.2, 256 (breaking down percentage of firms with formal ethics sys-
tems based on firm size).
121. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 18, at 1012–13 (advocating that firms utilize in-house
ethics specialists or committees).
122. According to a study by Professors Elizabeth Chambliss and David B. Wilkins, for
example, in many firms the individual held a formal position with a designated title and
specific assigned duties.  Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L. REV.
559, 565 (2002) [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role].  In others, the re-
sponsibilities and title of the position (for example, “our ethics guy”) are less formal in
nature. Id.
123. Id.  The study’s sample consisted of law firms ranging from 75 to over 1,000 attor-
neys. Id. at 561.
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counsel, and in close to 90% of those firms, general counsel advised
the firm on professional responsibility issues.124
The extent to which the typical law firm associate has access to
these kinds of designated ethics experts, however, is questionable.  Ac-
cording to the Altman Weil survey, although high-ranking law firm
partners typically had access to a firm’s general counsel, less than half
of the responding firms reported that associates were authorized to
access these individuals.125  And in small to mid-sized firms—where
the vast majority of lawyers in private practice are employed—there
are few designated ethics experts.  In Professor Fortney’s survey, only
15% of small-firm respondents indicated that they had a designated
ethics expert or similar position, as compared to 35% of mid-sized-
firm respondents.126
2. Results of the 2008 Study
My primary goals in conducting a survey regarding law firm ethi-
cal infrastructures were to obtain more data regarding the practices of
smaller law firms and, more specifically, the extent to which law firms
have in place measures for the internal resolution of ethical concerns.
Regarding the first goal, most of the empirical research to date has
focused on the practices of larger law firms.  For example, Professors
Chambliss and Wilkins’ research into law firm compliance procedures
was limited to law firms with a minimum of seventy-five attorneys.127
Yet, according to a 2000 American Bar Foundation survey, only 1.5%
of large firms in the United States consist of more than fifty attor-
neys.128  Likewise, Professor Fortney’s survey was limited to associates
in law firms with more than ten attorneys.129  Yet, according to the
American Bar Foundation survey, nearly 90% of the law firms in the
United States consist of ten or fewer lawyers.130  Thus, despite the
value of the previous surveys, there is a need for more data concern-
124. WARD BOWER, ALTMAN WEIL, INC., REPORT TO LEGAL MANAGEMENT: MAJOR LAW
FIRMS EMBRACE GENERAL COUNSEL CONCEPT 1 & fig.1, 10 fig.10 (2004), available at http://
www.altmanweil.com/dir_docs/resource/fa00e91f-9955-4dce-b6f4-d088b9fe2f0b_docu-
ment.pdf [hereinafter ALTMAN WEIL SURVEY].  Professor Fortney’s survey found that 56%
of large firms that responded employed a designated ethics counsel.  Fortney, supra note 1,
at 255 tbl.2.
125. ALTMAN WEIL SURVEY, supra note 124, at 10 fig.9.
126. Fortney, supra note 1, at 255 tbl.2.
127. See Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role, supra note 122, at 561.
128. CARSON, supra note 15, at 30.
129. Fortney, supra note 1, at 246 n.35.
130. CARSON, supra note 15, at 30.  By comparison, 87.3% of Tennessee law firms consist
of ten or fewer attorneys, according to the American Bar Foundation Survey. Id. at 204.
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ing the practices of smaller law firms.  Of the respondents to my sur-
vey, 75% were from firms consisting of ten or fewer attorneys.131
Nearly all of the respondents indicated that their firms had some
type of policy or procedure in place to help firm attorneys resolve
questions or concerns about their own ethical obligations in a mat-
ter.132  The most frequently cited specific practices were the tradi-
tional up-the-chain-of-command approach of referral to the attorney’s
direct supervisor, managing partner, or practice area leader.133  Re-
spondents—particularly from smaller firms—also frequently cited
more informal practices, such as consultation with other firm attor-
neys, colleagues in other firms, or representatives from the state disci-
plinary authority.134
Fewer respondents indicated that their firms used a designated
ethics counsel (12%), general counsel with responsibility for ethics
issues (5%), or ethics committee (5%) to help attorneys resolve their
ethical dilemmas.  Indeed, when asked specifically whether their firm
had a designated ethics counsel, general counsel who handles ethics
matters, ethics committee, or similar position, only 21% of respon-
dents answered in the affirmative.  Here, there was a clear distinction
between the practices of larger and smaller firms.  Not surprisingly,
larger firms were more likely to report the existence of designated
individuals within the firm charged with responsibility for handling
131. Respondents were asked to indicate the size of their law firms.  The results were as
follows:  1–2 attorneys: 28 (17.9%); 3–10 attorneys: 89 (57.1%); 11–24 attorneys: 21
(13.5%); 25–100 attorneys: 11 (7.1%); over 100 attorneys: 7 (4.5%).
132. Only 4% of respondents—all of them from firms with fewer than ten attorneys—
indicated that their firms had no measures in place to handle such matters.
133. Fifty-seven percent of respondents indicated that their firms used the practice of
referral to a managing partner or practice area leader.  Thirty-three percent reported the
use of referral to a lawyer’s direct supervisor.  Respondents were free to choose from a list
of possible policies or procedures.  Specifically, respondents were asked the following
question:
If an attorney in your firm has a question or concern about his or her ethical
obligations in a matter, what policies or procedures exist within the firm to help
the attorney resolve the issue?
Referral to designated ethics counsel
Referral to general counsel
Referral to ethics committee
Referral to ombudsman
Referral to managing partner or practice area leader
Referral to attorney’s direct supervisor(s)
Referral to outside counsel
Other (please explain)
None
134. Forty percent of respondents chose the “Other” option from the list of options
above. See supra note 133.  When asked to explain, these informal practices were the most
common explanations.
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ethics matters than were smaller firms.  Of the respondents from firms
with twenty-five or more attorneys, nearly 67% reported the existence
of such individuals.  Of the respondents from firms with ten or fewer
attorneys, only 15% reported the existence of such individuals.
The survey yielded similar data with respect to policies or proce-
dures regarding internal reporting of suspected misconduct on the
part of another attorney.  Most firms reported the existence of some
type of policy or procedure that allows an attorney with concerns
about suspected misconduct on the part of another attorney to resolve
those concerns.135  Again, respondents most frequently cited some
form of referral up the chain of command as a specific existing prac-
tice in their firms.136  However, only 15% indicated that they had a
formal written policy that encouraged attorneys to notify someone
within the firm about suspected misconduct involving another attor-
ney.  Once again, larger firms were more likely to report the existence
of such a policy than were smaller firms.  Of the responding law firms
with fewer than twenty-five attorneys, only 10% reported the existence
of such a policy.137  Of the larger responding firms, a slight majority
(56%) reported that they had such a policy.138  With respect to small
firms, these results are probably not surprising.  For example, a firm
consisting of two equal partners and no associates would obviously be
unlikely to have a formal internal reporting system in place.  However,
of the respondents from firms with between eleven and twenty-four
attorneys—firms that are almost certainly large enough to have and
potentially benefit from formal infrastructures, including some type of
internal reporting procedure—only one out of twenty-one (4.7%) re-
ported the existence of such a policy.  These findings appear consis-
tent with the retaliatory discharge cases brought by whistleblowing
lawyers; in contrast with many other whistleblower cases involving
non-lawyers,139 there is rarely, if ever, any mention of any type of inter-
135. Only 10% of respondents—all of them from firms of ten or fewer attorneys—re-
ported that their firms lacked any such policy.
136. Fifty-four percent of respondents indicated that their firms used the practice of
referral to a managing partner or practice area leader.  Twenty-six percent reported the
use of referral to a lawyer’s direct supervisor.
137. The p-value for this question was p < .001.
138. While it seems safe to conclude that the existence of such policies are more com-
mon at larger firms, the relatively small number of responding law firms of more than
twenty-five attorneys (eighteen total) makes it difficult to draw any conclusions about just
how common the practice is at larger firms.
139. See, e.g., Anda v. Wickes Furniture Co., 517 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting, in
a discrimination case, the employer’s anti-harassment policy, which instructed employees
to report objectionable behavior).
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nal reporting policy in existence at the law firms that encouraged in-
ternal reporting of misconduct.
One might suspect that if a firm encouraged the reporting of sus-
pected misconduct that it would also offer some assurance of protec-
tion from retaliation as a matter of course.  However, this is not
necessarily the case.  Although most of the respondents who indicated
the existence of a policy encouraging internal reporting also indicated
that the policy provided assurance of protection from retaliation, 25%
of respondents indicated that their policies did not contain any state-
ment providing assurance of protection from retaliation.140
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
As the law governing lawyers currently exists, Rule 5.1(a) does not
require law firms or individual partners to take any specific action with
respect to developing a firm’s ethical infrastructures, the rule is only
rarely enforced, and there is no guarantee of protection from retalia-
tion for attorneys who make internal or external reports of unethical
conduct.  There are any number of ways in which these shortcomings
could be addressed.  For instance, a jurisdiction’s disciplinary author-
ity could establish a formal operating procedure of investigating
whether a firm has complied with its obligations under Rule 5.1 every
time an ethics complaint against a lawyer in the firm is filed.  How-
ever, this Article focuses primarily on rules-based solutions to the cur-
rent problem.
As this Part argues, protection from retaliation for attorneys who
report misconduct is vital to the goal of promoting an ethical legal
profession and promoting public confidence.  Equally important to
these goals is the creation of formal procedures within law firms de-
signed to investigate and resolve concerns of possible unethical con-
duct.  To those ends, this Part proposes several alternatives to the
current regulatory framework regarding whistleblowing lawyers and
the creation of ethical infrastructures—beginning with the most con-
servative and ending with the most far-reaching—in an effort to
achieve these goals.
140. The survey did not yield a significant correlation between the size of the firm and
the assurance of protection from retaliation.  Eight out of ten responding firms with
twenty-five or more attorneys reported that their policies provided assurances of protec-
tion, whereas ten out of fourteen of smaller firms reported the same.  The p-value here was
.509.
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A. Rules-Based Approach to Prohibiting Retaliation Against
Whistleblowing Attorneys
1. The Need for Protection from Retaliation
If the legal profession wants attorneys to take seriously their ex-
ternal reporting obligations under Rule 8.3 and to feel free to raise
concerns internally over suspected unethical conduct, the profession,
at a minimum, needs to afford lawyers with some protection from re-
taliation in such instances.  At present, the Model Rules do not speak
at length to the disciplinary process.  In addition to the reporting re-
quirement contained in Rule 8.3(a), Rule 8.1 prohibits a lawyer from
making false statements of material fact in connection with a discipli-
nary proceeding, failing to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misap-
prehension known to have arisen in the matter, and knowingly failing
to respond to a lawful demand for information from a disciplinary
authority.141  These two rules represent the only explicit limitations
on lawyers’ conduct in connection with disciplinary proceedings.142
No rule expressly addresses a lawyer’s attempt to interfere with the
disciplinary process or to intimidate or retaliate against those who par-
ticipate in the process or otherwise seek to oppose conduct that con-
flicts with the ethical rules.  Nor do the Model Rules expressly prohibit
retaliation against lawyers who oppose unethical conduct internally.
This failure to adopt rules specifically protecting the sanctity of
the disciplinary process stands in marked contrast to the protection
afforded those who oppose unlawful or unethical conduct in some
other contexts and those who participate in other formal processes
designed to address wrongdoing.  At the federal level, statutes that
seek to address a specific problem (such as discrimination, safety, or
environmental concerns) frequently contain protection for internal as
well as external whistleblowers.143  For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (“Sarbanes-Oxley” or the “Act”)144 contemplates that employers
will establish procedures to encourage and provide for the internal
reporting of actions that may constitute a violation of securities law.
Specifically, Sarbanes-Oxley requires publicly traded companies to es-
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (2008).
142. Rule 8.5 addresses choice of law issues with respect to disciplinary proceedings, but
does not impose any ethical standard with which a lawyer must comply. See generally id. R.
8.5 (setting forth disciplinary authority and choice of law provisions).
143. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 15) (noting the protection for internal
whistleblowers in these types of statutes); see generally Cherry, supra note 45, at app. B (col-
lecting federal statutes that contain whistleblower protections).
144. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
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tablish internal procedures to address possible violations of securities
law,145 and envisions that employees will bring their suspicions of such
violations to their supervisors.  Thus, the whistleblower provision of
the Act makes it unlawful to take action against an employee when the
employee provides information or causes information to be provided
to a person with supervisory authority over the employee or when the
employee otherwise assists in an investigation regarding any conduct
which the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of
Sarbanes-Oxley.146  The Act also seeks to protect the sanctity of the
enforcement process itself by prohibiting adverse action against those
who “file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or otherwise assist in
a proceeding filed or about to be filed.”147  Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley
seeks to protect the act of opposing or bringing to light internally
what one reasonably believes amounts to a violation of the Act as well
as the act of participating in the enforcement process itself.148
The major federal employment discrimination statutes likewise
protect the act of internal reporting or opposition as well as more
formal participation in the external remedial process.  Title VII,149 for
example, provides protection from retaliation for an employee who
opposes internally what the employee reasonably and in good faith
believes to be conduct made unlawful by Title VII as well as for an
employee who files a formal charge of discrimination, testifies, assists,
or otherwise participates in a proceeding pursuant to Title VII.150
145. Id. § 105, 116 Stat. 759–64; see also infra notes 278–280 and accompanying text.
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2006).
147. Id. § 1514A(a)(2).
148. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-
Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 77–78 (2007) (noting the poten-
tially expansive breadth of protected activity under Sarbanes-Oxley).  The regulations ac-
companying the Act contain language regarding the responsibilities of supervising
attorneys relative to subordinate attorneys under their supervision that roughly tracks the
language of Model Rule 5.1. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.4(b) (2008) (stating that a supervisory
attorney must “make reasonable efforts to ensure that a subordinate attorney . . . that he or
she supervises or directs conforms” to Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirements).  The same is true
with respect to the duties of subordinate attorneys and Rule 5.2. See id. § 205.5(b) (“A
subordinate attorney shall comply with [the Act] notwithstanding that the subordinate at-
torney acted at the direction of or under the supervision of another person.”).
149. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)).
150. Id. § 704(a), 78 Stat. 257 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2000)); see
Wallace v. DTG Operations, Inc., 442 F.3d 1112, 1125 (8th Cir. 2006) (interpreting 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3 as prohibiting “opposition to practices that are not unlawful, if an em-
ployee acted based on good faith, objectively reasonable belief that the practices were
unlawful”).
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The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)151 contains a similar pro-
vision making it unlawful for an employer “to coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment
of” rights granted by the ADA.152
In enacting these provisions, Congress recognized that some type
of protection for both internal reporting and external participation in
the statutory remedial process was essential if the goals of the relevant
statutes were to be attained.  The tendency with these statutes has
been to focus on the need to preserve employee access and willing-
ness to access the statutory remedial processes.153  Permitting employ-
ers to intimidate and retaliate against those who file charges
concerning unlawful conduct would undermine the goals of the rele-
vant statute.  But protecting the willingness and ability of employees to
bring their concerns about improper behavior to superiors within an
organization has its own salutary effects.  By following established
channels, an employee who brings suspected wrongdoing to the atten-
tion of others within the company provides the company with the op-
portunity to correct the offending behavior before further harm is
done.154  Thus, the ability and willingness of employees to notify ap-
propriate individuals about the misconduct of others may obviate the
need to go outside the confines of the company as well as prevent or
mitigate future harm.
2. Using Existing Rules to Discourage Interference with the
Disciplinary Process and Retaliation Against Whistleblowing
Attorneys
As is the case with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Title VII, and other
statutes, the legal profession should prohibit retaliation not just
against those who report misconduct externally to disciplinary author-
ities, but against those who, in good faith, act reasonably in raising
concerns about misconduct within a law firm.  The Model Rules have
undergone extensive revision in the last decade, prompting many
151. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 and 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (2000)).
152. Id. § 503(b), 104 Stat. 370 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2000)).
153. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (explaining that the primary
purpose of the anti-retaliation provisions in the Civil Rights Act are to maintain “unfettered
access to statutory remedial mechanisms”).
154. See Parker v. Bal. & Ohio Ry. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[B]y
extending protection to employees who oppose discriminatory practices without recourse
to the EEOC, Congress encouraged voluntary internal attempts to remedy discrimina-
tion.”); see also Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (stating that the
creation of internal mechanisms for addressing complaints of discrimination “could en-
courage employees to report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive”).
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states to evaluate what changes, if any, they wish to adopt.155  There-
fore, some jurisdictions may be suffering from ethics overload and are
unlikely to adopt yet another series of substantive revisions to their
rules.  Even so, there are currently several existing rules of profes-
sional conduct, which, if disciplinary authorities were so inclined,
could be used to prohibit retaliation against whistleblowing attorneys.
a. Prohibiting Retaliation Against External Whistleblowers: The
Duty to Report, Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration
of Justice, and Interference with the Disciplinary
Process
There are several existing rules that relate indirectly to the prob-
lem of retaliation against lawyers who make external reports of mis-
conduct to disciplinary authorities.  One approach to the problem
might be to recognize that inherent in a lawyer’s duty under Rule
8.3(a) to make a disciplinary complaint about misconduct that reflects
adversely on another lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects is a duty on the part of the lawyer’s employer
or the subject of the disciplinary complaint not to subvert the discipli-
nary process.  In Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Con-
duct v. Miller,156 a former in-house lawyer made a threat to her former
employer that if the employer did not provide her with compensation
for her dismissal and withdraw a disciplinary complaint it had filed
against her, she would file charges with the Securities and Exchange
Commission against the employer as well as charges of sexual harass-
ment and trade libel.157  The Iowa Supreme Court held that making
these threats amounted to a violation of the rule regarding the report-
ing of serious misconduct to disciplinary authorities.158  In the court’s
view, the duty to report misconduct “implies a duty by the subject at-
torney not to frustrate that process, and an attempt to interfere in the
grievance process is a basis for discipline.”159
Another approach would focus on a lawyer’s duty to avoid engag-
ing in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice under
Model Rule 8.4(d).160  The language of the rule is unquestionably
155. See Lucian T. Pera, Grading ABA Leadership on Legal Ethics Leadership: State Adoption of
the Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 637, 638 & n.1
(2005) (discussing the ABA’s Ethics 2000 initiative and the response of state bars).
156. 568 N.W.2d 665 (Iowa 1997).
157. Id. at 666.
158. Id. at 667.
159. Id.
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2008).
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broad and has been the subject of vagueness criticisms.161  Although
courts and disciplinary authorities have adopted various interpreta-
tions of Rule 8.4(d),162 the interpretation most faithful to the actual
language of the rule focuses on whether, in the words of one court,
the conduct “impedes or subverts the process of resolving disputes; it
is conduct which frustrates the fair balance of interests or ‘justice’ es-
sential to litigation or other proceedings.”163  Examples include man-
ufacturing conflicts of interest in order to force recusal164 and lying
under oath.165
Several courts have held that the rule applies not just to conduct
in connection with traditional litigation, but also to attempts to pre-
vent others from filing disciplinary complaints.166  In Florida Bar v.
Frederick,167 the Florida Supreme Court held that an attorney who re-
quired clients to sign a release agreeing to not contact the Florida Bar
with complaints concerning the attorney or to withdraw any com-
plaints they had previously filed before he would release funds to the
161. See, e.g., In re Discipline of Attorney, 815 N.E.2d 1072, 1078 (Mass. 2004) (stating
that the broad language of the rule “presents the risk of vagueness and arbitrary applica-
tion” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Grievance Adm’r v. Fried, 570 N.W.2d 262, 265
(Mich. 1997) (per curiam) (noting that application of such a “broad rule” requires
caution).
162. See, e.g., Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Childress, 770 A.2d 685, 694 (Md. 2001) (find-
ing that an attorney who had solicited sex from minors violated rule).
163. In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 628 (Alaska 2001); see also People v. Jaramillo, 35 P.3d
723, 731 (Colo. 2001) (stating that the rule “requires proof of some nexus between the
conduct charged and an adverse effect upon the administration of justice”); Fla. Bar v.
Pettie, 424 So. 2d 734, 737–38 (Fla. 1982) (noting that Florida’s version of Rule 8.4(d),
barring conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, prohibits those activities that
“undermine[ ] the legitimacy of the judicial processes”).
164. E.g., Fried, 570 N.W.2d at 267 (“A lawyer who joins a case as co-counsel, and whose
principal activity on the case is to provide the recusal, is certainly subject to discipline.”).
165. E.g., In re Mason, 736 A.2d 1019, 1022 (D.C. 1999) (finding that an attorney en-
gaged in conduct “prejudicial to the administration of justice” when the attorney lied
under oath to a federal agency).
166. See, e.g., People v. Vsetecka, 893 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Colo. 1995) (per curiam) (offer-
ing to pay firm to stop a disciplinary investigation); In re Wilson, 715 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Ind.
1999) (per curiam) (inserting a term into a settlement agreement with a client that re-
quired the client to withdraw a disciplinary complaint); In re Tartaglia, 798 N.Y.S.2d 458,
460–61 (N.Y. 2005) (per curiam) (improperly interfering with an investigation into a com-
plaint of professional misconduct); In re Conduct of Boothe, 740 P.2d 785, 787, 790 (Or.
1987) (per curiam) (negotiating with a client for an assurance that the client would not file
litigation against an attorney); Missouri Supreme Court Advisory Opinion, Formal Op. 122,
at 1–2 (2006) (attempting to “purchase the silence of complainants” against an attorney).
In some states, such conduct is specifically prohibited by rule. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(h) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) (“A lawyer shall not enter into an
agreement with a client or former client limiting or purporting to limit the right of the
client or former client to file or pursue any complaint before the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission.”).
167. 756 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
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clients amounted to a violation of Florida’s version of Rule 8.4(d).168
Rejecting the attorney’s argument that the rule applied only to con-
duct in a judicial proceeding, the court stated that “conduct that
prejudices our system of justice as a whole also is encompassed by” the
rule.169  Similarly, in Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Artimez,170 the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that an attorney who
negotiated a similar arrangement with a client had likewise engaged
in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.171  After noting
that “ ‘[t]he principle purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is
to safeguard the public’s interest in the administration of justice,’” the
court concluded that the attorney’s attempt to avoid the ethical obli-
gations and disciplinary process that governed his actions amounted
to a violation of Rule 8.4(d).172
Several courts have also held that retaliation and intimidation di-
rected at others for their conduct in connection with the disciplinary
process amounts to conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice.173  In one instance, an attorney was disciplined after threatening
to retaliate against individuals who filed disciplinary complaints
against him by filing lawsuits against them.174  In another, an attorney
attempted to intimidate a witness in a disciplinary proceeding against
the attorney.175
By enforcing Rule 8.4(d) against law firm attorneys who retaliate
against other firm attorneys who participate in the disciplinary pro-
cess, disciplinary agencies and reviewing courts can further the goals
underlying the Model Rules while hopefully reducing the number of
instances of retaliation.  The effects of retaliation are not limited to
the immediate victims of retaliation.  Instead, employer retaliation is
often an attempt to send a warning to others not to engage in similar
behavior.176  In the case of retaliation against attorneys who comply
168. Id. at 83, 87.
169. Id. at 87.
170. 540 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 2000).
171. Id. at 163–65.
172. Id. at 164–65 (quoting Daily Gazette Co. v. Comm. on Legal Ethics of the W. Va.
State Bar, 326 S.E.2d 705, 706 (W. Va. 1984)); see also In re Discipline of Eicher, 661 N.W.2d
354, 365 (S.D. 2003) (“Attempting to bargain away a disciplinary complaint also constitutes
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” (citation and internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
173. E.g., Fla. Bar v. Perlmutter, 582 So. 2d 616, 617 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam); In re
Friedland, 416 N.E.2d 433, 438–39 (Ind. 1981) (per curiam); In re Discipline of Eicher, 661
N.W.2d at 365.
174. Perlmutter, 582 So. 2d at 617.
175. In re Friedland, 416 N.E.2d at 435.
176. NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987).
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with their ethical duty to report out unethical conduct, retaliation has
the effect of chilling participation in the disciplinary process, a result
that unquestionably “impedes or subverts” the disciplinary process.
And as the purpose of the disciplinary process is to safeguard the pub-
lic interest in the administration of justice, retaliation against attor-
neys who participate in the disciplinary process fits neatly within the
prohibition against conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
Of course, the ability of the existing ethics rules to combat retalia-
tion in the legal profession depends on both the willingness of attor-
neys to report instances of retaliation and the willingness of
disciplinary authorities to prosecute lawyers and firms who engage in
such action.  Neither action is particularly common at present.  The
organized bar’s past experience with enforcement, however, suggests
the possibility that a few highly publicized prosecutions under Rule
8.4(d) for retaliation might have the desired deterrent effect.177
b. Prohibiting Retaliation Against Internal Whistleblowers:
Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice, The
Duty to Report, and the Duties of Firm Partners and
Subordinate Lawyers
Disciplinary authorities and reviewing courts could take a similar
approach with respect to the problem of retaliation against those who
make internal reports of suspected misconduct.  If, as discussed, law
firm retaliation or intimidation directed at an attorney who makes an
external report of misconduct amounts to conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice,178 then retaliation or intimidation that oc-
curs because the firm believes an attorney is contemplating or planning
to file such a report is equally prejudicial to the administration of the
disciplinary process.  Several courts have sensibly concluded that this
type of “anticipatory retaliation” amounts to unlawful retaliation in
the employment discrimination context.179  As long as there is a
causal connection between the adverse action and the filing of the
disciplinary complaint, it is immaterial whether the adverse action oc-
177. When, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court disciplined an attorney solely for
his failure to report pursuant to Rule 8.3(a), “Illinois’s bar disciplinary authorities observed
a substantial increase in Rule 8.3 reports.”  Perlman, supra note 31, at 475.
178. See supra notes 160–175 and accompanying text.
179. E.g., Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002); Sauers v.
Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Bojangles Rests., Inc., 284 F.
Supp. 2d 320, 328 (M.D.N.C. 2003); see also Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend, supra note 102,
at 983–84 (explaining that several federal courts have held that anticipatory retaliation is
actionable in employment discrimination cases).
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curred prior to or after the filing of the complaint; it is retaliation and
it undermines the disciplinary process.
Similarly, disciplinary authorities and reviewing courts could, in
good faith, recognize the existence of an implied ethical duty not to
interfere with the disciplinary process that is implicated with the filing
of an internal report of suspected misconduct.  If, as at least one court
has concluded, Rule 8.3(a)’s command that attorneys report serious
misconduct to disciplinary authorities implies a duty on the part of
the subject attorney not to interfere with the disciplinary process,180
then the theory of anticipatory retaliation should make it unethical
for the subject attorney to take adverse action in anticipation of the
filing of a disciplinary complaint.  Provided the reporting attorney has
acted reasonably and in good faith in raising concerns internally over
suspected misconduct by another attorney, an implied ethical duty on
the part of firm partners exists not to retaliate against or seek to intim-
idate the reporting attorney.
Likewise, disciplinary authorities might recognize the existence
of an implied ethical duty not to retaliate against an attorney who
makes an internal report of suspected misconduct stemming from
Rules 5.1 and 5.2.  Rule 5.2 is clear that a subordinate attorney’s viola-
tion of the ethical rules is not excused simply because the subordinate
was acting at the direction of a superior.181  But the comments to Rule
5.2 just as clearly contemplate a dialogue between the subordinate
and a supervising attorney taking place over “reasonably arguable”
questions of professional responsibility.182  Therefore, it hardly seems
a great stretch to conclude that an implied ethical duty exists on the
part of firm partners not to retaliate against a subordinate who, in
good faith, raises “reasonably arguable” questions concerning the
subordinate’s ethical obligations in relation to a dialogue with a super-
vising attorney.
Finally, a broader ethical duty might be said to exist in Rule
5.1(a)’s command that law firm partners “make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assur-
ance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.”183  Simply stated, a firm partner who retaliates against a
firm attorney who has raised concerns about the ethical behavior of
another attorney has not made the “reasonable efforts” required by
the rule.  The same is true of the firm partner who knows of the retali-
180. See supra notes 156–159 and accompanying text.
181. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.2 (2008).
182. Id. R. 5.2 cmt. 2.
183. Id. R. 5.1(a).
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ation but stands silent as it occurs.  The comments explain that firms
should implement measures to “detect and resolve” possible ethical
problems.184  Stifling internal reports of suspected misconduct or per-
mitting such stifling is the opposite of what the rule envisions.  Ac-
cordingly, state disciplinary authorities should treat such conduct as a
violation of Rule 5.1(a).185
3. Adopting Specific Anti-Retaliation Ethical Rules
Another partial solution to the problem of retaliation against at-
torneys who make either external or internal reports of misconduct
about another attorney would be to adopt a new ethical rule prohibit-
ing such conduct.  Federal whistleblower protection provisions are
premised on the need to preserve the willingness of employees to util-
ize the external mechanisms in place to remedy unlawful conduct and
the desirability of encouraging internal opposition and reporting of
unlawful conduct.186  The same logic applies to imposing an explicit
anti-retaliation or intimidation provision in a jurisdiction’s legal ethics
code.
Lawyers will likely always be reluctant to report the misconduct of
another lawyer.  Many non-lawyer employees are reluctant to report
wrongdoing for fear of retaliation, despite the existence of statutory
anti-retaliation provisions.187  Given the high value the legal profes-
sion places on confidentiality, lawyers might, if anything, be more re-
luctant than non-lawyers to make an external report of wrongdoing.
But this is all the more reason why it makes sense to explicitly prohibit
retaliation against lawyers who take such action.  In addition to provid-
ing some measure of assurance for potential whistleblowers, an ex-
plicit prohibition on intimidation or retaliation sends a message to
lawyers that informing disciplinary authorities about another lawyer’s
serious misconduct is not just an ethical requirement the legal profes-
sion regards with a wink and a nod, but an action that the profession
values and encourages.
184. Id. R. 5.1 cmt. 2.
185. See Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm Partners as Their Brothers’ Keepers, 96 KY. L.J.
231, 258–59 (2008) [hereinafter Richmond, Law Firm Partners], for an argument that the
failure of a law firm partner to raise questions internally about the possible misconduct of
another firm attorney may amount to a breach of fiduciary duty.
186. See supra notes 146–154 and accompanying text.
187. See Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? The Psychological and
Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 117, 122 (1995)
(reporting results of study showing why employees do not report instances of discrimina-
tion to their employers).
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Of course, the protections afforded by Sarbanes-Oxley, Title VII,
and other measures are statutory in nature.  The ethical rules gov-
erning attorneys, while often codified, are not statutes in the literal
sense and are not designed to be the basis for civil or criminal liabil-
ity.188  Therefore, the inclusion of an anti-retaliation rule might raise
two possible objections.  First, some might argue that there is some-
thing unseemly or unnatural about including a prohibition on retalia-
tion against whistleblowers in what is fundamentally a code of ethics.
However, most state codes of ethics already contain other more
mechanical and statute-like measures.  Rule 8.1 already regulates the
mechanics of the disciplinary process to some extent by prohibiting
lawyers from knowingly making false statements in connection with
the disciplinary process or failing to respond to a request for informa-
tion from a disciplinary authority.189  Rule 8.5 is simply a choice of law
provision wrapped up in ethical garb.190  Thus, an anti-retaliation rule
would not amount to an anomaly within the rules of professional
conduct.
Another possible objection is that an ethical rule prohibiting re-
taliation would not, by itself, afford a discharged attorney any remedy.
Some states have enacted statutes designed to prevent interference
with the operation of other types of professional disciplinary
processes191 or state ethics commissions.192  Given the similarly impor-
tant role that the legal disciplinary rules and process play, individuals
who report suspected violations of these rules or who participate in
the disciplinary process are deserving of similar protection.  There-
fore, a separate whistleblower protection statute for lawyers might be
desirable.  However, the inclusion of an anti-retaliation provision
within a state’s ethics code might accomplish two things.  First, the
188. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., cl. 20 (stating that the rules “are not
designed to be a basis for civil liability”).
189. Id. R. 8.1.
190. See id. R. 8.5 (noting the scope of disciplinary authority, and setting forth choice of
law provisions).
191. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.990(6) (West 2008) (making it a misdemeanor to
impede, obstruct, threaten, or interfere with the State Board of Medical Licensure or any
of its members, or of any officer, agent, inspector, or investigator of the board, in the
performance of their duty to regulate the professional conduct of medical professionals).
192. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 4-2-6-13 (LexisNexis 2008) (prohibiting retaliation
against an employee because the employee filed a complaint with, provided information
to, or testified before state ethics commission).  Other statutes make it illegal to retaliate
against a health care provider because the provider objects to or refuses to participate in
what the provider reasonably believes is a practice in violation of the law or the ethical
standards of the medical profession and that the provider reasonably believes poses a risk
to public health. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 187(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2004 &
Supp. 2008).
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inclusion of such a rule might amount to the clear expression of pub-
lic policy courts require in deciding whether to recognize a common
law tort claim of retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy.193
Thus, the inclusion of an anti-retaliation rule might make it more
likely that a discharged attorney would obtain a remedy.  In addition,
the inclusion of an anti-retaliation rule would be important because of
the statement it would make about the collective values of the legal
profession.194  Although a whistleblower statute might be desirable, it
is particularly appropriate for the legal profession—an almost entirely
self-regulating profession—to adopt ethical rules providing this type
of protection in order to instill confidence in the public.195
B. Structural Approach to the Plight of Whistleblowing Attorneys:
Improving Ethical Infrastructures
The enforcement measures described above would represent a
welcome change to the current state of affairs.  However, they re-
present a piecemeal approach to a larger problem.  Although impos-
ing discipline in the case of retaliation against a whistleblowing
attorney addresses one aspect of the problem, the larger issue is that
the ethical infrastructures of many law firms lack any structure de-
signed to encourage the internal reporting, investigation, and resolu-
tion of ethical misconduct.
Currently, the Model Rules focus almost exclusively on external
reporting to disciplinary authorities as the means of addressing lawyer
misconduct.  However, in light of the numerous problems associated
with the operation and enforcement of Rule 8.3(a)’s external report-
193. See generally Long, Retaliatory Discharge, supra note 8, at 1090–97 (discussing the pos-
sibility of a professional code of ethics to serve as the expression of public policy necessary
to support a retaliatory discharge claim).
194. See Brenda Jones Quick, Ethical Rules Prohibiting Discrimination by Lawyers: The Legal
Profession’s Response to Discrimination on the Rise, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 5,
54 (1993) (noting the ability of ethical rules to send a message to the public about the
values of the legal profession).
195. Adopting such a provision might also increase the odds that whistleblowing attor-
neys would prevail under the common law theory of retaliatory discharge in violation of
public policy.  In deciding whether to recognize a retaliatory discharge claim, courts often
impose the requirement that the firing offend “a clear public policy which is evidenced by
an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision.”  Crews v. Buckman
Labs. Int’l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852, 864 (Tenn. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Collins v. Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 657 (Ohio 1995) (stating that one element of a
retaliatory discharge claim is that a “‘clear public policy existed and was manifested in a
state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the common law’”
(quoting Henry H. Perritt Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self
Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 397, 398 (1989)).  The inclusion of an anti-retaliation provi-
sion within a jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct might qualify.
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ing requirement, it is time that jurisdictions began experimenting
with encouraging the internal reporting of suspected misconduct.
Therefore, this Section suggests various ways the legal profession can
encourage firms to develop their ethical infrastructures, including in-
ternal reporting, investigation, and resolution procedures.
1. The Benefits of Internal Whistleblowing
Although the duty to make external reports of serious miscon-
duct to disciplinary authorities plays an important role in rooting out
unethical practice, internal reporting of suspected lawyer misconduct
offers several advantages.  Internal reporting is more consistent with
traditional notions of professional responsibility and, therefore, the
self-image of most lawyers, than external reporting.  Therefore, it is
more likely to be an effective method of rooting out professional
misconduct.
External reporting has two distinct disadvantages in terms of
bringing to light lawyer misconduct.  First is the concern common to
whistleblowers of all kinds that “reporting out” either amounts to dis-
loyal conduct or will be perceived as such.  The traditional notion of
employee loyalty involved unquestioning faithfulness.196  Accordingly,
the external whistleblower, in particular, has long been viewed in
some quarters as inherently disloyal.197
To be sure, more modern conceptions of loyalty emphasize
greater independent judgment on the part of an employee.198  Fur-
thermore, the public’s attitude toward whistleblowers has warmed in
196. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 8) (explaining that pre-modern employ-
ment law originated from master-servant principles in which “a faithful servant employee
followed orders and exercised fidelity without question”).
197. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the
Media, and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 151,
161–62 (1994) (characterizing arbitration decisions in the collective bargaining context as
concluding that “whistleblowing to either government officials or the media constitutes
‘go[ing] public,’ which is detrimental to the employer and, thus, disloyal” (alteration in
original)); Terry Morehead Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MNCs, and Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT’L L. 457, 463 n.42 (2002) (“Studies of whistleblowers indicate that the best predictor of
retaliation is external whistleblowing.” (citing Janet P. Near et al., Explaining the Whistle-
Blowing Process: Suggestions from Power Theory and Justice Theory, 4 ORG. SCI. 393, 399 (1993)));
Jonathan Macey, Getting The Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of Whistleblowing and
Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1901 (2007) (stating that whistleblowers “tradition-
ally have been considered tattletales and otherwise viewed with suspicion”).
198. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 8) (explaining that today employees are
expected to exercise “discretion and independent judgment,” recognizing their role in
“assisting the organization in operating within the bounds of legality”).
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recent years because of various corporate scandals.199  This trend is
reflected in the ethical rules governing lawyers as well.200  Under the
former version of Rule 1.13, an attorney who learned of an organiza-
tional client’s serious wrongdoing was precluded from notifying
others outside of the organization about the misconduct except to the
extent the disclosure was permitted by one of the narrow confidential-
ity exceptions.201  Under the revised Rule 1.13, after “reporting up”
the corporate ladder, an attorney who knows of client misconduct is
now permitted to “report out” to the extent the attorney “reasonably
believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.”202
Despite the general softening of attitude toward whistleblowing,
there is still considerable suspicion regarding external whistleblowers.
Reporting outside the confines of the organization potentially exposes
the organization to adverse publicity and financial harm.203  And re-
gardless of one’s conception of employee loyalty, conduct that poten-
tially exposes one’s employer to harm certainly raises concerns over
loyalty, no matter how noble the motivation.204  It is perhaps for this
reason that employees generally prefer an internal reporting op-
tion.205  As Professor Richard E. Moberly has stated, “An internal dis-
closure channel provides a way for employees to demonstrate their
loyalty by disclosing misconduct without having to report colleagues
to ‘outside’ authorities.”206
Attorneys in law firms may be particularly susceptible to fears that
their external reports to disciplinary authorities of another attorney’s
misconduct are either inherently disloyal or will be viewed as such.
Although working in any organization may produce feelings of loyalty
toward the organization, the special characteristics of law firm employ-
ment are particularly likely to lead to loyalty of the blind obedience
199. See Macey, supra note 197, at 1901 (stating that whistleblowers “have recently en-
joyed a distinct rise in popularity”).
200. See Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49
VILL. L. REV. 725, 732–33 (2004) (noting the changes to the Model Rules regarding disclo-
sure of client confidences following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley).
201. See id. at 802 n.300 (commenting on the former version of Model Rule 1.13(b)).
202. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c)(2) (2008).
203. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Work-
ing?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 242 (1987) (stating that “negative publicity, investigations, and
administrative and legal actions . . . usually ensue after external whistleblowing”).
204. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 8) (“[A] loyal employee must view the good
of the organization as a whole and behave according to what is best for the future of the
corporation.”).
205. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
206. Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1142.
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type.207  This is undoubtedly one of the reasons why the external re-
porting obligation of Rule 8.3(a) often goes unfulfilled.208  Some in
the legal profession view those who make external reports of wrongdo-
ing with particular disdain, as evidenced by the long list of derisive
names for Rule 8.3(a), such as the “squeal rule,”209 the “snitch
rule,”210 and the duty “to ‘rat’ on one’s colleagues.”211  In short, exter-
nal reporting of unethical conduct is at odds with the self-image of
many lawyers.
The second disadvantage of a system of external reporting of eth-
ical misconduct is that a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality may prevent
the lawyer from ever making the report.  When a lawyer’s duty to
make an external report of misconduct comes into conflict with a law-
yer’s duty not to reveal information relating to the representation of a
client without the client’s consent under Rule 1.6,212 the duty of confi-
dentiality prevails.213  Although a comment to Rule 8.3(a) advises that
“a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure where
prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client’s interests,”214
a client’s lack of consent prevents a lawyer from ethically making a
report of misconduct to disciplinary authorities.  Therefore, at least
some serious misconduct is unlikely to go reported to disciplinary au-
thorities as a result of the interplay between rules.  Internal reporting
within a firm presents no such problems.  As a result, an internal re-
porting process has distinct advantages in terms of addressing miscon-
duct that would otherwise go unreported.215
207. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
208. See Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Practical Analy-
sis of Lawyer Self-regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 202 (1999) [hereinafter Richmond,
Duty to Report] (stating that when “an unethical lawyer and a potential reporting lawyer
work in the same law firm, there is little chance that even serious misconduct will be re-
ported to disciplinary authorities” due to the reporting lawyer’s sense of loyalty and fear of
retaliation).
209. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., “Squeal Rule” Considered for Change, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 26, 1990,
at 13.
210. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a
Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 682 (2006).
211. Larry O. Natt Gantt II et al., Professional Responsibility and the Christian Attorney: Com-
paring the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Biblical Virtues, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 1,
87 (2006).
212. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.6(a) (2008).
213. See id. R. 8.3 cmt. 2 (“A report about misconduct is not required where it would
involve violation of Rule 1.6.”).
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. See generally Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 27) (noting that, due in part to
confidentiality concerns, “internal speech is frequently the most reasonable, if not the
only, path for an employee who witnesses” misconduct).
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An internal reporting device offers a number of other benefits.
As discussed, establishing a process whereby attorneys can raise con-
cerns of unethical behavior internally before that behavior has harm-
ful consequences for clients makes practical sense for law firms in
terms of litigation and reputational costs.216  Relying on institutional
theory, Professors Chambliss and Wilkins have suggested that the crea-
tion of a formal, ethical infrastructure may also signal to key constitu-
ents, such as clients and potential firm members, that the firm has
high ethical standards—a characteristic the firm may use as a selling
point.217  From the perspective of the legal profession more broadly,
the existence of an effective internal reporting device also relieves
some of the burden on disciplinary authorities, thereby allowing au-
thorities to save enforcement costs and direct their efforts in a more
efficient manner.218  Part of the justification for Rule 8.3(a) is that
lawyers are better situated to detect and recognize unethical conduct
on the part of other lawyers than are clients.219  If this is true, then
lawyers within the same firm are uniquely positioned to detect the
misconduct of their colleagues and fulfill the goals of the rule.220
The legal profession’s embrace of such devices would also send a
welcome and much-needed signal to the public that the profession
truly is capable of policing its members.  An external reporting re-
quirement that is vague, rarely enforced, and infrequently followed
may lead to the view, both within the legal profession and outside,
that the legal profession is not willing to regulate itself.221  This is es-
pecially true when the profession does little to nothing to protect
those who actually obey the rule and suffer adverse consequences as a
result.222
But most importantly, the establishment of effective, formal struc-
tures for dealing with internal reports of unethical conduct contrib-
216. See id. (“[A]llowing the employer to first investigate and correct possible violations
prevents potential high costs to both the employee and the organization, which will avoid
harms to its reputation and the costs of undergoing a government investigation.”); see gener-
ally Davis, supra note 18, at 106 (discussing the need for law firms to have clearly defined
reporting procedures to ensure effective management).
217. Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 24, at 710.
218. Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 27).
219. See Greenbaum, supra note 63, at 265 (explaining that lawyers, “because of their
training in the law, and their day-to-day interactions with other lawyers, are better situated
than most to observe and evaluate the conduct of other attorneys”).
220. See Richmond, Duty to Report, supra note 208, at 203 (“[C]olleagues are almost
surely best positioned to observe and act on misconduct by other lawyers in their firms.”).
221. See Greenbaum, supra note 63, at 275–76 (stating that a poorly drafted rule harms
the public image of the profession).
222. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
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utes to a sense of shared values within an organization, which makes it
more likely that firm lawyers will come forward with concerns about
misconduct within the firm.223  The existence of a formal, internal re-
porting process sends a message to the members of a law firm that
professionalism and compliance with ethical rules are a shared value
and that the firm takes seriously any individual concerns in this re-
gard.224  In this regard, the creation of such a formal process is, in the
words of Professors Chambliss and Wilkins, “culturally symbolic.”225
But the symbolism may also produce practical results.  Although
whistleblowers understandably fear retaliation, one of the strongest
disincentives to whistleblowing is the whistleblower’s fear that the em-
ployer will do nothing to address the whistleblower’s concerns.226  By
instituting formal policies and procedures for handling internal re-
ports of unethical conduct—including assurances that no retaliation
will occur—law firms can help alleviate both of these concerns.227  In
addition, where a law firm demonstrates a formal commitment to be-
ing receptive to ethical concerns, an institutional norm of ethical
practice may be more likely to develop.228
Of course, it is unlikely that there will be a massive rise in the
number of internal reports of misconduct should such formal proce-
dures become the norm in the legal profession.  The pressures—both
intrinsic and extrinsic to the legal profession—that dissuade attorneys
from reporting misconduct to disciplinary authorities will also un-
doubtedly dissuade some attorneys from taking advantage of whatever
internal reporting system a law firm may implement.  However, as be-
tween a system that relies exclusively on external reporting and a sys-
tem that relies on both internal and external reporting to root out
misconduct, the choice should be obvious.  Ultimately, the legal pro-
fession must encourage its members to develop internal reporting
223. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 27) (explaining the benefits of an effective
internal reporting system); see generally Davis, supra note 18, at 109 (stating a law firm’s
culture is “not an adequate basis for uniform risk management” and that written policies
and procedures related to risk management are necessary).
224. See generally Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note
24, at 713 (stating that the creation of internal compliance procedures signals to lawyers
that the firm takes ethics seriously).
225. Id.
226. Moberly, supra note 206, at 1143–44.
227. See id. at 1143 (arguing that the structure of an organization’s internal reporting
process can reduce concerns over disloyalty and retaliation).
228. See Chambliss & Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure, supra note 24, at
714 (drawing upon organizational theory to argue that a relationship exists between struc-
ture and development of a culture).
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procedures to complement the pre-existing duty to report misconduct
to disciplinary authorities.
2. The Requirement That Firms Have an Internal Process for the
Reporting and Investigation of Suspected Misconduct Is
Implicit in Rule 5.1(a)
Assuming that the legal profession should encourage greater reli-
ance on internal reporting of suspected misconduct, the question be-
comes how this can best be achieved.  One could rely on law firms to
voluntarily develop such procedures out of a sense of self-interest.
Even if one takes such an optimistic view of the willingness of law
firms to take such steps, the existence of such procedures would be
spotty.  A better solution would be to interpret Rule 5.1(a) as requir-
ing the existence of such procedures and enforcing the rule accord-
ingly against individual law firm partners or partners in management
or policy-making positions.
a. Rule 5.1(a)’s Implicit Requirement that Firms Have an Internal
Process for the Reporting and Investigation of Suspected
Misconduct
As written, Rule 5.1(a) could support the imposition of a duty to
have an internal reporting system in place.  At present, a law firm part-
ner has a duty to “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has
in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the
firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”229  Thus, part-
ners have a duty to make reasonable efforts to, in the words of a com-
ment to the rule, “detect and resolve” ethical violations committed by
any member of the firm.230  Surely then, a law firm must do something
to increase the odds that ethical violations will be brought to the at-
tention of relevant individuals within the firm (detection) and dealt
with appropriately (resolution).  And the comments are clear that
when the rule uses the term “measures,” it is referring to “policies and
procedures” and “systems”231—that is, infrastructure.  As a specific ex-
ample of such policies and procedures, a Michigan ethics opinion
states that under its version of Rule 5.1 “each firm is obligated to es-
tablish and administer a record retention policy or plan, to educate all
229. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2008) (emphasis added).
230. Id. R. 5.1 cmt. 2.
231. Id. cmts. 2 & 3.
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lawyers and nonlawyers in the firm as to its operation, and to monitor
compliance.”232
Of course, many law firms have failed to develop internal compli-
ance policies and procedures in other areas, such as billing proce-
dures,233 where the rule would seem to mandate it.  The failure of
firms to do so, however, is hardly an argument for why no such duty
exists.  In other areas, Rule 5.1(a)’s malleable “reasonable efforts” and
“reasonable assurance” language makes the establishment of bright-
line rules mandating certain types of compliance procedures undesir-
able.  It would make little sense, for example, to require that a large
law firm have a single, across-the-board policy dictating to attorneys
how they must keep track of filing and other important deadlines.
Promulgating an internal reporting and investigation policy is a
different matter.  Although such systems might take any number of
forms depending upon the size and structure of a law firm, providing
a mechanism by which suspected misconduct can be addressed inter-
nally goes to the essence of what Rule 5.1(a) is about.  Without such a
mechanism, it is virtually impossible for a firm to give “reasonable as-
surance that all lawyers in the firm conform” to a jurisdiction’s ethical
rules.  In addition, unlike the case of procedures for keeping track of
filing deadlines, where individual attorneys in a firm may have their
own acceptable preferences, firm attorneys need a uniform policy for
addressing suspected misconduct if the firm is to deal with such mat-
ters effectively—no matter the size of the firm.
A New York ethics opinion suggests that the existence of a system
that encourages internal reporting and that provides for investigation
and resolution of suspected misconduct is an integral component of
compliance with Rule 5.1(a).234  According to the opinion, a firm has
a duty to have “procedures in place to respond to ethical inquiries or
lapses.”235  In addition, a firm has “a duty to make inquiries where it
has reason to believe there is a likelihood that there may be ethical
232. State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Op. No. R-5
(1989), available at http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/r-005.
htm (last visited May 13, 2009).
233. See Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 128 (noting that most firms lack
billing guidelines and “do little or nothing to train new associates about proper billing
procedures”).
234. The duty for New York attorneys is contained in the New York Lawyer’s Code of
Professional Responsibility. See N.Y. LAWYER’S CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-104(A)
(2007) (requiring a law firm to “make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the
firm conform to the disciplinary rules”).
235. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Opinion No. 762, at 6 (2003), availa-
ble at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=home&TEMPLATE=/CM/Con-
tentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=18773 (last visited May 13, 2009).
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problems.”236  These statements suggest the existence of a duty to in-
vestigate and respond to allegations of possible misconduct by attor-
neys within the firm.  Thus, a firm fails to make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assur-
ance that all lawyers in the firm are practicing in an ethical manner
where the firm lacks a device for investigating and responding to sus-
pected misconduct that is brought to the firm’s attention.  What these
measures might look like is discussed in greater detail below.237
Rule 5.1(a) applies to an individual lawyer’s reasonable efforts,
but not to those of a whole firm.  But in New York, the duty is on a law
firm to “make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm
conform to the disciplinary rules.”238  However, the central message of
the opinion—that “reasonable efforts” to detect and resolve unethical
conduct necessarily include some type of reporting, investigation, and
resolution procedure—applies with equal force to current Rule
5.1(a).
b. Implying a Duty on the Part of Firm Leaders to Establish an
Internal Process for the Reporting and Investigation of
Suspected Misconduct
Don’t blame you, don’t blame me, blame the fellow behind the tree.239
A complimentary approach would be to impose a duty on firm
leaders to develop internal reporting, investigation, and resolution
measures.  Because Rule 5.1(a) is a rule of individual professional re-
sponsibility, it may be difficult to identify which partners failed to
make the reasonable efforts required to ensure that the firm has an
ethical infrastructure in place.  This is arguably one of the rule’s fail-
ings.  The size or complex bureaucracy of some law firms may make it
difficult for disciplinary authorities to determine which partners made
what efforts to influence the development of a firm’s ethical infra-
structure.240  Moreover, a firm’s structure may limit the managerial
236. Id.
237. See infra Part IV.B.3.
238. N.Y. LAWYER’S CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-104(A) (2007); see Lachman,
supra note 66, at 1 (noting that New York’s ethics codes provide for law firm discipline).
239. Cf. Editorial, Everybody Else Did It, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2008, at A14 (crediting the
late Senator Russell Long as stating that the core truth of tax policy was “Don’t tax you,
don’t tax me, tax the fellow behind the tree”).
240. See Schneyer, supra note 4, at 10–11 (stating that it is difficult to identify the parties
responsible for a firm’s failure to develop an ethical infrastructure “because it is difficult to
attribute omissions to specific individuals in a group”); see also Elizabeth Chambliss & David
B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 339 (2003)
[hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, A New Framework] (noting similar concerns).
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and decision-making authority that some partners possess.241  There-
fore, as a practical matter, some partners possess little ability to influ-
ence firm policy, let alone the ability to ensure that the firm maintains
internal policies and procedures designed to promote the ethical
practice of law.
Firm leaders, however, stand in different shoes.  Many law firms
now employ centralized management structures which delegate much
of the firm’s business management to relatively few individuals.242  For
some of these individuals, management of the firm constitutes their
sole or primary duty.243  As a result of this delegation of authority,
many firm partners lack the practical ability to monitor the actions of
other partners or influence firm policy regarding monitoring.244  But
a law firm’s managing partner or members of a firm’s management
committee possess the ability to enact internal policies and proce-
dures designed to promote compliance with the ethical rules.  For
purposes of Rule 5.1(a), the buck should stop with them.  For exam-
ple, the comments following Tennessee’s current version of Rule 5.1
specifically acknowledge this reality by providing that when a law
firm’s partners delegate centralized managerial authority to a single
or small group of individuals, only those individuals are subject to the
duty imposed by Rule 5.1(a).245
A 2003 decision from the Delaware Supreme Court hints at the
idea of a heightened duty on the part of managing partners, and
those in similar positions of authority, to ensure that firms have mea-
sures in place that guarantee attorneys are practicing in an ethical
manner. In re Bailey246 is a disciplinary case involving a managing part-
ner charged with violations of Rule 1.15.247  Specifically, an audit had
241. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
242. See Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 127 (“Most large law firms have
moved away from decentralized, collegial governance and instead have extensive manage-
ment hierarchies . . . .”).
243. See id. (noting that members of the law firm management hierarchy often include
“professional (full-time, specialized) managers”).
244. See Robert W. Hillman, Whatever Happened to the Market for Partners’ Desks? The Milberg
Indictment as an Inquiry into Accountability, 2 MD. J. BUS. & TECH. L. 415, 423 (2007) (stating
that such delegation “lessens the role of partners in monitoring the actions of each
other”).
245. TENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 1 (2008).
246. 821 A.2d 851 (Del. 2003) (per curiam).
247. Id. at 853.  The partner was also charged with violations related to dishonesty, con-
duct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and failure to supervise non-lawyer em-
ployees. Id. at 856.  However, the crux of the court’s opinion and the disciplinary charges
involved Rule 1.15 violations. See id. at 853 (explaining that the primary issue in the case
was whether the managing partner engaged in misconduct with respect to the mishandling
of the law firm’s books and records).
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revealed “numerous deficiencies in the [f]irm’s bookkeeping obliga-
tions.”248  Addressing the partner’s argument that he had not engaged
in “knowing misconduct” for purposes of imposing discipline, the
court stated that even if there was no evidence that the partner had
ordered or implicitly directed the invasion of client funds, “the sus-
tained and systematic failure of a managing partner to supervise a
firm’s employees to ensure compliance with Rule 1.15 may not be
characterized as simple negligence.”249  Specifically, it was the part-
ner’s role as managing partner that supported the court’s conclusion.
According to the court, “the managing partner of a law firm has en-
hanced duties, vis-a`-vis other lawyers and employees of the firm, to
ensure the law firm’s compliance with its recordkeeping and tax obli-
gations under the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Con-
duct.”250  Although recognizing that a managing partner cannot
guarantee flawless accounting, “it is the managing partner’s responsi-
bility to implement reasonable safeguards to ensure that the firm is
meeting its obligations with respect to its books and records.”251
There are several reasons to be cautious about reading In re Bailey
too broadly.  For example, the managing partner in question was not
charged with a Rule 5.1(a) violation for failure to take reasonable
steps to ensure that the firm had measures in place to promote com-
pliance with the rules regarding safeguarding client property and
bookkeeping.252  That said, a fair reading of the opinion establishes
that the court’s conclusion about the “enhanced duties” of a manag-
ing partner is grounded every bit as much on the principles underly-
ing Rule 5.1(a) as it is the special rules regarding maintaining client
property and bookkeeping.  In a footnote, the court stated that it actu-
ally found support for its conclusion about those with managerial au-
thority for a law firm in a comment accompanying Rule 5.1.253
Indeed, in a subsequent decision, the Delaware Supreme Court associ-
248. Id. at 854.
249. Id. at 863–64 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
250. Id. at 853.
251. Id. at 865.
252. Moreover, under Delaware’s Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys were re-
quired to certify that their accounting practices were in compliance with the Rules, and law
firm attorneys could generally satisfy this requirement by expressly stating that they were
relying on their firm’s managing partner’s assurance that the firm itself was in compliance
with the rules. Id. at 864 n.30.
253. See id. at 865 n.31 (describing Delaware’s ethical rules with respect to managerial
authority).  The comment was apparently not in effect at the time of the disciplinary
change, but had recently been adopted in Delaware. See id. (noting the effective date of
the new ethics provisions).
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ated In re Bailey with the responsibilities of firm managers under Rule
5.1.254
The existence of internal measures for ensuring compliance with
the ethical rules regarding bookkeeping and the safeguarding of cli-
ent funds is simply one facet of a firm’s ethical infrastructure. If a
managing partner has special responsibilities by virtue of Rule 5.1 for
ensuring that the firm has measures in place to comply with the ethi-
cal rules in the specific context of safeguarding of client funds, then it
logically follows that a managing partner has special responsibilities
concerning the development of other aspects of the firm’s ethical in-
frastructure.  Every law firm partner has the obligation to make rea-
sonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed
to ensure firm-wide compliance with the ethical rules.255  The concept
of “reasonableness,” however, varies depending upon the circum-
stances.  A reasonable person is required to exercise any superior abil-
ities the person may possess.256  The leadership of a law firm (such as
managing partners and members of management, executive, or simi-
lar committees) possesses the ability to set firm policy and implement
change.  Therefore, it should be a relatively simple matter for such
individuals to establish internal reporting and investigation policies
and procedures.  Because such policies and procedures are essential
to fulfilling the purpose of Rule 5.1, it should be the unusual case
where a managing partner or similar figure should be able to avoid
discipline where a firm lacks such measures.257
Directing enforcement efforts toward firm leaders also has practi-
cal advantages for disciplinary authorities.  Perhaps one reason why
enforcement efforts under Rule 5.1(a) have been so lacking is because
disciplinary authorities are reluctant to discipline partners for acts of
omission rather than acts of commission.258  However, another possi-
254. See In re Froelich, 838 A.2d 1117, 1120 n.13 (Del. 2003) (per curiam) (discussing
the court’s earlier decision in In re Bailey).
255. See Epstein, supra note 18, at 1024 (citing the opinion of an ethics expert with re-
spect to law firm partners’ duty to establish measures that ensure attorneys in a firm con-
form to the rules and standards of professional conduct).
256. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 cmt. m (1965) (explaining that the
reasonable person “is required to exercise the superior qualities that he has in a manner
reasonable under the circumstances”).
257. See Richmond, Law Firm Partners, supra note 185, at 240 (“[L]aw firm leaders are
more likely to violate [Rule 5.1(a)] than are average partners . . . .”); see generally Lachman,
supra note 66, at 6 (“[A] strong argument can be made that the managing lawyers who
have failed to take [steps to ensure that all lawyers are in compliance with the ethical rules]
should bear at least some responsibility for the underlying misconduct resulting from that
failure.”).
258. See Miller, supra note 70, at 292–93 (explaining the difficulties with imposing disci-
plinary sanctions against partners and supervising attorneys).
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ble explanation might be that the size and structure of many firms
simply makes it extremely difficult for disciplinary authorities to en-
force the rule.  Unless disciplinary authorities are willing to take a
dart-board approach and randomly target selected partners to see if
they have complied with the rule, they must investigate every partner’s
efforts to establish internal compliance procedures and policies.  In
contrast, once disciplinary authorities identify the locus of a firm’s de-
cision-making authority—a relatively easy task—they can direct their
attention to these individuals.
In short, courts and disciplinary authorities should read Rule
5.1(a), as written, as imposing a duty upon law firm partners to make
reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in place an internal
complaint and investigation procedure through which attorneys can
raise concerns over suspected misconduct.  And, at least in the case of
firm leaders, the rule should also be read as typically imposing a duty
to see to it that the firm actually develops such policies and
procedures.
3. The Creation of a Firm-Wide Duty to Establish an Ethical
Infrastructure, Including a Process for the Reporting and
Investigation of Suspected Misconduct
Enforcing Rule 5.1(a) against firm partners or firm leaders who
fail to establish an internal process for the reporting and investigation
of suspected misconduct would represent an improvement on the cur-
rent state of affairs.  However, in order for Rule 5.1(a) to fulfill its
purposes, it should be amended to impose a firm-wide duty with re-
spect to the implementation of a law firm’s ethical infrastructure,
rather than simply an individual duty.  In doing so, the legal profes-
sion should look to recent reforms in corporate governance.
a. Firm-Wide Responsibility for the Establishment of an Ethical
Infrastructure
Any discussion of professional discipline for law firms begins with
a 1990 article by Professor Ted Schneyer.  In the article, Professor
Schneyer focused primarily on Rule 5.1(a) and the development of a
firm’s ethical infrastructure.259  Since that time, various authors have
debated the merits of imposing discipline against a firm as a whole for
its failures in this regard.
259. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 4, at 18 (discussing the use of Rule 5.1(a) as a tool to
establish an effective ethical infrastructure).
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Opponents have raised a number of objections to firm-wide disci-
pline in general and such discipline more specifically in the case of
Rule 5.1(a).  These include the arguments that such discipline is un-
necessary because most law firms (at least large ones) already have
ethical infrastructures in place260 and unfair because it subjects “inno-
cent” partners to fines and other sanctions stemming from conduct
they had nothing to do with.261  Whatever the merits of these argu-
ments, the objection that has thus far had the most traction is that
firm-wide discipline would reduce individual accountability.262  In
short, imposing a duty on a law firm as a whole to institute policies
and procedures designed to promote the ethical practice of law, oppo-
nents argue, would encourage attorneys to “shirk their own supervi-
sory duties”263 and lead to a “lack of personal responsibility for ethics
compliance” more generally.264  Indeed, it was this concern over re-
ducing personal accountability that led the ABA Ethics 2000 Commis-
sion to narrowly decide against adopting such a firm-wide duty.265
There are several responses to this argument.  One is the point
raised previously that, even if every partner in a firm were inclined to
make reasonable efforts to develop the firm’s ethical infrastructure,
the structure of many law firms effectively precludes the ability of
some partners to do so.266  Another response is that in light of the
unwillingness or inability of partners to effectuate meaningful change
and the unwillingness or inability of disciplinary authorities to enforce
the rule as written, it is difficult to see how imposing firm-wide disci-
pline would lead to an increase in individual shirking.267  If anything,
260. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (reporting that most large law firms have
ethical infrastructures in place).
261. Richmond, Law Firm Partners, supra note 185, at 262–63.
262. See Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 125 (recognizing the “key argu-
ment” against firm-wide liability that such a rule could undermine individual
accountability).
263. Id. at 126.
264. Julie Rose O’Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?  A Response to Professor
Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 21 (2002); see also Richmond, Law Firm Part-
ners, supra note 185, at 262 (arguing that firm-wide discipline “reduces the likelihood that
individual lawyers will comply with ethics rules”); see generally Davis, supra note 18, at 95–96
(noting the argument that reliance on ethics advisors and committees within law firms may
cause firm lawyers to shift responsibility for ethical decisionmaking and moral judgment to
others).
265. Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 125; Margaret Colgate Love, The
Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 470–71 (2002).
266. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
267. See Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy, supra note 7, at 129 (“Law firm discipline may
not be the answer to inadequate supervision, but it is hard to argue that law firm discipline
could make matters worse.”).
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law firm discipline for failure to make reasonable efforts to ensure
that all lawyers in the firm are practicing in an ethical manner seems
more likely to lead firm partners to take an active interest in the firm’s
ethical infrastructure.268  Given the lack of enforcement of the cur-
rent rule, partners have reduced incentive for taking an interest in the
monitoring and supervision of other attorneys whose actions do not
directly impact the partner.
Ultimately, perhaps the strongest response to opponents of law
firm discipline in this context is that because the rule seeks to en-
courage firm-wide policies and procedures designed to ensure compli-
ance with the ethical rules, it is only fitting that the duty to develop
those policies rest with the firm itself.  Currently, Rule 5.1(a) speaks
directly to the responsibility of an individual lawyer to influence a
firm’s compliance procedures.  But the ultimate focus of the rule is on
the firm itself.  The goal of the rule is “to ensure that the firm has in
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the
firm” are practicing in an ethical fashion.269  Although the legal pro-
fession should certainly encourage individual partners to be actively
engaged in the process of shaping formal policies and procedures
within a firm, it is the end result that is most important in this context.
An organization’s policies represent the organization’s official
position on a matter and may be relevant for purposes of determining
the organization’s civil liability in other contexts.270  In the employ-
ment discrimination context, for example, the existence of an anti-
harassment policy with a complaint and investigation procedure that
allows a company to effectively respond to a sexual harassment com-
plaint internally may limit the employer’s vicarious liability for such
harassment.271  Why then should a law firm, which stands to benefit or
incur liability on the basis of its policies and procedures in other con-
texts, be excused from professional discipline on the basis or absence
of its compliance policies and procedures?272
268. See Schneyer, supra note 4, at 8 (explaining that under the current model of indi-
vidual liability, firm partners have “an incentive to shift responsibility for an ethical breach
onto others in the firm”).
269. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2008) (emphasis added).
270. See, e.g., Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 445 F.3d 586, 592–93 (2d Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (discussing employer’s official and unofficial policies as the bases for potential
liability in a breach of contract action).
271. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (explaining that
employers can raise as a defense to vicarious liability for sexual harassment the existence of
an anti-harassment policy with a compliant procedure).
272. One response is that as between a rule of individual discipline and firm discipline,
the rule least likely to produce negative consequences for individual attorneys is, paradoxi-
cally, a rule of individual discipline.  Thus, it is the rule the legal profession has chosen. See
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b. Lessons from Corporate Law
Recent corporate law reforms provide one possible model for the
revision of Rule 5.1.273  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains a rough ana-
logue to Rule 5.1 in terms of the development of ethical infrastruc-
tures.  In order to increase investor confidence in the accuracy of
financial information,274 the Act requires publicly traded companies
to adopt a code of ethics or to explain to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) why they have not done so.275  According to SEC
regulations, a code of ethics is a set of written standards that are:
reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing and to promote:
(1) Honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical han-
dling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between per-
sonal and professional relationships;
(2) Full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure
in reports and documents that a registrant files with, or sub-
mits to, the Commission and in other public communica-
tions made by the registrant;
(3) Compliance with applicable governmental laws, rules
and regulations;
(4) The prompt internal reporting of violations of the code
to an appropriate person or persons identified in the code;
and
(5) Accountability for adherence to the code.276
Like Rule 5.1, Sarbanes-Oxley and accompanying regulations seek to
encourage publicly traded corporations to promote ethical and lawful
conduct.  They go further than Rule 5.1, however, in that they more
explicitly require corporations to develop internal structures for deal-
ing with possible misconduct and more explicitly require a locus of
responsibility for the corporation’s handling of misconduct.
As discussed, Sarbanes-Oxley provides protection from retaliation
for internal whistleblowers.277  However, it does more than simply pro-
vide protection for those who make internal reports of misconduct.
Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA.
L. REV. 453, 454 (2008) (advancing the proposition that many legal issues are “decided in
the way that offers the best result for the legal profession” as a whole).
273. See generally Schneyer, supra note 4, at 23–24 (suggesting the appropriateness of
corporate criminal liability as an analogy to law firm discipline).
274. See Cherry, supra note 45, at 1055 (explaining that the purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley
Act is “to increase transparency in financial markets, which allows investors to rely on the
accuracy of financial information”).
275. 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (2006).
276. 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b) (2008).
277. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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Under Section 301, a company’s audit committee must establish pro-
cedures for “the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints re-
ceived by the issuer regarding accounting, internal accounting
controls, or auditing matters.”278  An audit committee must also estab-
lish procedures for “the confidential, anonymous submission by em-
ployees of the issuer of concerns regarding questionable accounting
or auditing matters.”279  If a publicly traded corporation fails to imple-
ment these procedures, the national securities exchanges and na-
tional securities associations are prohibited from listing the securities
of the corporation.280
Sarbanes-Oxley does not require that a corporation adopt any
particular reporting procedure.281  The SEC opined that the circum-
stances and needs of a small issuer with relatively few employees might
be completely different than those of a large, multi-national issuer
and, therefore, a “one-size-fits-all” approach was undesirable.282  The
failings of pre-Sarbanes-Oxley internal reporting procedures, how-
ever, provide a clue as to what procedures the SEC and Congress envi-
sioned.  Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, many corporations adopted internal
reporting systems in which reports “flowed up through the corporate
management hierarchy.”283  Out of either self-interest or concerns
about sanctions against the corporation, corporate executives often
failed to pass along the relevant information to the corporation’s di-
rectors.284  According to the SEC, an internal reporting procedure
must “cultivate open and effective channels of information.”285  For
this reason, it may be that in order for a company’s complaint proce-
dure to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley, complaints about accounting
practices must be routed to a corporation’s audit committee, a com-
mittee that, under the Act, must consist entirely of independent direc-
tors who receive no compensatory fee when acting within their
committee or board capacity.286  Regardless of the exact form a corpo-
278. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A) (2006).
279. Id. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B).
280. Id. § 78j-1(m)(1)(A).
281. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,798
(Apr. 16, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249 and 274) (clarifying that
the SEC is “not mandating specific procedures that the audit committee must establish”).
282. Id.
283. See Moberly, supra note 206, at 1135.
284. Id. (explaining that disclosure channels requiring complaints to flow through the
corporate hierarchy placed employee disclosures “at risk of management blocking and
filtering”).
285. Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg. at 18,798.
286. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A)–(B) (2006) (setting forth the criteria for an audit
committee); Marian Exall, Compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley Complaint Procedures Requirement
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ration’s reporting procedure takes, any effective procedure will have a
mechanism by which employees may bypass the traditional manage-
ment hierarchy.287  In theory, such procedures should lead to more
internal reporting of suspected misconduct and less retaliation from
management.288
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (“OSG”), which were
amended in 2004 following numerous corporate scandals,289 place a
similar emphasis on the use of formal structures to promote “an orga-
nizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment
to compliance with the law.”290  Under the OSG, a corporation’s crim-
inal penalties for violations of law may be increased or reduced de-
pending upon the absence or presence of “an effective compliance
and ethics program.”291  An effective program is one that is reasonably
designed, implemented, and enforced so that it generally will be effec-
tive in preventing and detecting criminal conduct.292  This also neces-
sarily entails responding appropriately to criminal conduct once it has
been detected and taking adequate disciplinary measures against indi-
viduals who have engaged in criminal conduct or failed to take rea-
sonable steps to prevent or detect criminal conduct.293
The OSG make clear that an essential part of an effective compli-
ance and ethics program is a formal procedure that allows employees
to raise concerns about possibly unlawful conduct without fear of re-
taliation.  This procedure may include “mechanisms that allow for an-
onymity or confidentiality, whereby the organization’s employees and
agents may report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual
Could Prove Challenge to Audit Committees, CORP. COUNS. WKLY. NEWSL. (Bureau of Nat’l Af-
fairs), June 25, 2003 (“The audit committee must be intimately involved in the receipt and
handling of employee complaints, as well as making initial decisions about the implemen-
tation of the process.”); Moberly, supra note 206, at 1138 (stating that Sarbanes-Oxley re-
quires that independent directors on the board’s audit committee receive whistleblower
disclosures).
287. See Exall, supra note 286 (“An existing procedure that directs all complaints to man-
agement, and leaves it up to management to decide whether and how to investigate, will
not be adequate.”); see also Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68
Fed. Reg. at 18,798 (providing that “[m]anagement may not have the appropriate incen-
tives to self-report all questionable practices” and that an “employee or other individual
may be reticent to report concerns regarding questionable accounting or other matters for
fear of management reprisal”).
288. See Moberly, supra note 206, at 1143 (stating that requiring upper levels of the
corporation to receive complaints reduces retaliation from supervisors and managers and
encourages more whistleblowing as a result).
289. Id. at 1134 n.125.
290. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (2008).
291. Id. § 8B2.1(a).
292. Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2).
293. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(6)–(7).
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criminal conduct.”294  As mentioned, Sarbanes-Oxley similarly re-
quires that a corporation’s audit committee develop procedures for
confidential, anonymous reporting of concerns over questionable
practices.295  Such measures should, theoretically, encourage employ-
ees to be more forthcoming about their concerns of illegal or unethi-
cal behavior taking place within an organization.296  At least partly in
response to these measures, anonymous ethics hotlines are now in-
creasingly common in the corporate world.297
A similar idea exists in the employment discrimination field.  Em-
ployers may sometimes avoid vicarious liability for a supervisor’s un-
lawful harassment of an employee if they adopt effective mechanisms
that allow for the reporting, investigation, and resolution of suspected
discrimination.298  In order to avail itself of the defense, an employer
must effectively communicate the existence of its policies and proce-
dures to its employees.299
Finally, both Sarbanes-Oxley and the OSG contain provisions re-
quiring companies to develop accountability measures.  Both require
that a corporation have designated individuals who are responsible for
the development and implementation of compliance procedures.
Sarbanes-Oxley designates specifically a corporation’s audit commit-
tee as having this responsibility.300  The OSG do not identify any par-
294. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C).
295. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
296. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 57) (describing anonymous reporting as an
“important way” to reduce the fear of retribution); Moberly, supra note 206, at 1143 (find-
ing that because Sarbanes-Oxley allows anonymous reporting of wrongdoing, “employees’
fear of retaliation should be minimized”).
297. See Cherry, supra note 45, at 1074 (noting the use of anonymous hotlines); Lobel,
supra note 44 (manuscript at 57) (same); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prose-
cution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 864 (2007) (noting that as part of its settlement agreement with
the federal government, accounting firm KPMG agreed to establish a hotline to encourage
internal whistleblowing).  For an example of such a hotline, see Ernst & Young’s web-based
EY/Ethics Hotline,  https://secure.ethicspoint.com/domain/en/report_custom.asp?clien-
tid=6483 (last visited May 19, 2009).
298. See Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that, to demonstrate that an employer took reasonable care to prevent and
correct harassment, an employer’s policy must contain reasonable complaint procedures
and that the employer must have taken reasonable steps to correct the harassment); see also
supra note 271 and accompanying text.  The affirmative defense is available only where the
harassment has not resulted in a tangible employment action and where the employee has
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any corrective measures the employer has in place
or otherwise to avoid harm.  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
299. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998) (holding that the
employer could not utilize the defense because it failed to effectively disseminate its
policy).
300. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A) (2006) (providing that an audit committee must
establish procedures for “the receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints”).
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ticular individuals within an organization as being the responsible
parties, but they do make clear that a corporation’s board of directors
and “[h]igh-level personnel” share responsibility for the establishment
of an effective compliance and ethics program.301  For a corporation’s
program to qualify as an effective compliance and ethics program,
high-level personnel must ensure that the organization has a program,
and specific individuals within this group must be assigned overall re-
sponsibility for the program.302  The organization must delegate day-
to-day operational responsibility to specific individuals within the or-
ganization, who must “report periodically to high-level personnel and,
as appropriate, to the governing authority.”303  In addition, the organ-
ization’s governing authority must be knowledgeable about the con-
tent and operation of the program and exercise reasonable oversight
with respect to the implementation and effectiveness of the
program.304
c. Application to the Legal Profession
The differences between the corporate world and the legal pro-
fession would make it impossible to transfer the provisions of either
Sarbanes-Oxley or the OSG wholesale to the ethical rules governing
lawyers.  For example, there is no direct parallel in the legal profes-
sion to the role that independent directors play in the corporate
world.305  In addition, the small size of many law firms would make it
impossible to require the kind of accountability and monitoring struc-
ture the OSG envision.  Ultimately, the diversity within the legal pro-
fession in terms of the size and structure of law firms makes it
impossible to establish a “one-size-fits-all” rule.306  Nonetheless, there
are certainly lessons that the legal profession can learn from corpo-
rate law in terms of amending Rule 5.1 to provide for more meaning-
ful obligations with respect to the development of ethical
infrastructures.
Rule 5.1 should be rewritten to dispense with the vague “reasona-
ble efforts” language and to make explicit the requirement that firms
301. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2008).
302. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B).
303. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C).
304. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A).
305. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
306. See Chambliss & Wilkins, A New Framework, supra note 240, at 345 (“[T]here is little
prospect of defining structural standards that make sense for all firms.”).
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develop ethical infrastructures.  Borrowing from the OSG,307 law firms
should be required to develop an effective compliance and ethics pro-
gram.  A program would be effective when it is reasonably designed,
implemented, and enforced so that it generally will be effective in as-
sisting all lawyers in the firm in the ethical practice of law and in
preventing and detecting unethical conduct.308  The nature of an ef-
fective compliance and ethics program would, of course, vary depend-
ing upon the size and structure of a firm.  A firm consisting of a
husband and wife with no associates could hardly be expected to de-
velop the same types of formal structures that a much larger firm
could.  However, an effective program would, at a minimum, have cer-
tain characteristics.309
First, the legal profession should follow the example of Sarbanes-
Oxley and the OSG and require that law firms—regardless of size—
designate an individual partner or group of partners within the firm
as having responsibility for the development and overall administra-
tion of a firm’s ethical infrastructure.310  In addition to providing a
measure of accountability, this requirement would force firms to focus
on and adequately fund their compliance procedures.311  In keeping
with the OSG, the individuals designated with responsibility for devel-
oping and administering a firm’s compliance program should be re-
quired to report periodically to the partnership (or firm leadership,
such as a managing partner or management committee).  All partners
within a firm should also be required to be knowledgeable about the
firm’s compliance procedures and exercise reasonable oversight re-
307. See supra note 291 and accompanying text (describing how the OSG requires corpo-
rations to develop effective ethics programs and increases or decreases criminal penalties
based on the existence of such programs).
308. See supra note 292–294 and accompanying text (describing requirements of an ef-
fective compliance and ethics program under the OSG).
309. For an example of a firm compliance program, see Davis, supra note 18, at 125–31.
310. See supra notes 300–304 and accompanying text.  A similar requirement exists in
Australia.  In New South Wales, Australia, legal service providers are permitted to form
Incorporated Legal Practices (“ILPs”), which enable the organization “to incorporate and
provide legal services either alone or alongside other legal service providers who may, or
may not be ‘legal practitioners.’”  Steven Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, Incorporated Legal
Practices—A New Era in the Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22 PENN
ST. INT’L L. REV. 671, 671 (2004).  An ILP must designate at least one legal practitioner as a
“solicitor director,” who, in addition to being responsible for the management of the legal
services provided by the ILP, is responsible for ensuring that the ILP has “appropriate
management systems” in place to ensure that legal services are provided in a competent
and ethical manner. See id. at 681–87 (describing the duties of solicitor directors).
311. See Chambliss & Wilkins, A New Framework, supra note 240, at 348–49 (stating that
the requirement to identify a specific, responsible partner would provide an incentive for
managers to focus on compliance efforts and help the law firm justify the cost of investing
in proactive compliance efforts).
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garding the implementation and effectiveness of the program.  These
requirements should help prevent the firm’s decisionmakers and,
more generally, its partners from remaining ignorant of the firm’s
ethics structures and address the concerns about encouraging part-
ners to shirk their oversight responsibilities.312
In advocating for a similar approach, Professors Chambliss and
Wilkins concluded that, based on their research, designated in-house
compliance specialists “play a significant role in promoting ethical
awareness and the quality of structural controls within firms.”313  A
firm’s designation of such individuals imposes a measure of accounta-
bility on a firm’s compliance procedure as well as further investing
firms in the compliance process.314  The specific measures that the
designated individual or individuals implement may vary widely de-
pending upon the size and structure of a firm.315  Research suggests,
however, that the more the measures become integrated within a
firm, the more likely partners and associates are to utilize the
measures.316
Another component of an effective compliance and ethics pro-
gram would be the establishment of measures to encourage firm attor-
neys to make internal reports of suspected unethical conduct on the
part of other attorneys and to seek guidance concerning their own
ethical obligations without fear of retaliation.317  The existence of a
formal policy encouraging reports and inquiries concerning ethical
obligations would help promote an organizational culture and atmos-
phere that values compliance with ethical norms in a more direct
312. See David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1808 (2007) (stating that OSG’s require-
ments “should go a long way in ensuring that the top management and the board of direc-
tors are not ‘out of touch’ with the ethical environment of the organization”); supra note
263–265 and accompanying text (discussing concerns that imposing a firm-wide duty
under Rule 5.1 would encourage shirking of individual responsibility).
313. Chambliss & Wilkins, A New Framework, supra note 240, at 347.
314. Id. at 348–49.
315. See generally Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role, supra note 122, at 576–83
(describing the effect of firm size on the extent to which firms invest in in-house compli-
ance specialists and other ethical infrastructure).
316. See id. at 580–83 (discussing the willingness of partners to seek out the services of a
full-time ethics specialist and the consequent willingness of associates to do the same).  For
this reason, ethics compliance should be the primary job responsibility of this individual
where resources permit.  This makes it more likely that firm lawyers—particularly associ-
ates—will view the individual as being quasi-independent and, therefore, view the individ-
ual as a legitimate resource. See Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 57) (explaining that
the presence of quasi-independent compliance professionals can make employees more
comfortable utilizing internal procedures).
317. See Davis, supra note 18, at 106 (arguing that “law firms need clearly defined report-
ing procedures”); supra notes 294–297 and accompanying text.
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manner than Rule 5.1 currently does.318  Admittedly, in some firms—
such as a small firm with no junior attorneys—it may make little sense
to have an internal reporting policy.  Ordinarily, however, the exis-
tence of an internal reporting policy should be considered an essen-
tial part of an effective compliance and ethics program.  Borrowing
from the OSG and employment discrimination law, law firms should
also be required by rule to respond appropriately to any requests for
guidance or reports of suspected misconduct they receive, including,
where appropriate, disciplining an attorney who has engaged in
misconduct.319
The nature of a firm’s program could easily vary, depending
upon the nature of the firm.  For example, confidential or anonymous
reporting might be impossible for smaller firms.  At a minimum, how-
ever, any internal reporting procedure would ordinarily have to do
the following in order to satisfy the amended rule:
(1) encourage firm lawyers to seek guidance as to their ethi-
cal obligations and report suspected unethical conduct on
the part of other firm lawyers;
(2) provide assurance of protection from retaliation for
those who take such action;
(3) provide a means whereby firm lawyers may take such ac-
tion, including a system of confidential reporting and report-
ing to individuals other than immediate supervisors where
practicable;
(4) provide for effective investigation; and
(5) provide for prompt and effective response, including in-
ternal discipline where appropriate.320
In order to fulfill the purposes of Rule 5.1, it is essential that law
firms have formal structures in place to handle ethics questions and
reports of suspected misconduct.  Firms must also effectively promote
these structures and encourage attorneys to utilize them without fear
of retaliation.  According to Professor Orly Lobel, “[e]mployees are
more likely to use internal procedures when the procedures are for-
mally established and the corporation asserts its commitment to a fair
process.”321  Consequently, it is essential that law firms provide assur-
318. Cf. supra note 290 and accompanying text (noting OSG’s emphasis on promoting
organizational cultures that encourage ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance
with the law).
319. See supra notes 290–293, 298–299 and accompanying text.
320. Cf. Marc I. Steinberg & Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability Exposure
When the Whistle Blows in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 30 J. CORP. L. 445, 457 (2005) (listing
measures necessary for an effective complaint procedure under Sarbanes-Oxley).
321. Lobel, supra note 44 (manuscript at 57).
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ance of protection from retaliation where an attorney reports sus-
pected wrongdoing on the part of another or raises concerns about
the attorney’s ethical obligations.322  All law firms, regardless of size,
should also have measures in place to ensure that firm attorneys can
seek guidance when confronted with difficult ethical issues.  Although
it might not be practicable for smaller firms to have a designated eth-
ics “expert” to whom lawyers may refer ethics questions, smaller firms
might be able to satisfy the requirement by directing firm lawyers with
ethics-related questions to utilize the bar-approved legal ethics hot-
lines that exist in many jurisdictions in consultation with the individ-
ual or individuals in the firm charged with administration of the firm’s
ethical infrastructure.323
In order to encourage internal reporting and inquiries, firms
should, where feasible, develop reporting and inquiry procedures that
allow attorneys to bypass the traditional chains of command.  Attor-
neys may be less likely to raise concerns about their own ethical dilem-
mas or the suspected misconduct of other attorneys to their direct
supervisors or managing partners who have substantial control over
the fate of the attorney’s career.  Similarly, information may be less
likely to flow up the chain of command than where there is a desig-
nated, semi-independent point person outside the normal chain of
command.324  As an example, many larger law firms currently desig-
322. In his excellent article on legal ethics and risk management, Anthony E. Davis pro-
vides, in an appendix, parts of his firm’s risk management policies.  Under these written
policies, all attorneys in the firm have an obligation to report suspected misconduct on the
part of another attorney.  The list of types of misconduct that must be reported under the
policy is fairly lengthy (for example, “any known or suspected instance of alcohol or other
substance abuse”).  Davis, supra note 18, at 126.  Thus, the reporting obligation is quite
extensive.  Nothing in the policy contained in the appendix, however, provides lawyers of
the firm with any assurance that they will not suffer adverse consequences if they make
such a report.  Thus, firm lawyers must report many forms of misconduct (and some forms
that they might not be ethically obligated to do under the Model Rules), but if they do,
they have no assurance they will not be fired for doing so.  From the perspective of an
attorney in the firm (particularly an associate), this seems like the worst of all possible
worlds.  It is worth noting once again that this is similar to the approach that the legal
profession as a whole takes with respect to external reporting of lawyer misconduct, and
the results there have hardly been a success. See supra notes 50–60 and accompanying text
(discussing instances in which attorneys have been fired for reporting or threatening to
report unethical conduct and the general reluctance of attorneys to make external reports
of misconduct).
323. For examples of state bar hotlines, see State Bar of California Ethics Hotline, http:/
/www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_generic.jsp?cid=10131 (last visited May 19, 2009),
and State Bar of Georgia—Ethics Helpline, http://www.gabar.org/ethics/ethics_helpline_
faqs/ (last visited May 19, 2009).
324. See supra notes 283–288 and accompanying text.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-4\MLR403.txt unknown Seq: 63 17-JUN-09 10:19
848 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 68:786
nate an attorney within the firm as the designated point person for
ethics-related questions.325
The investigation and resolution obligations are also critical.
Firm attorneys—and associates in particular—are less likely to report
suspected wrongdoing if they do not believe their concerns will be
taken seriously.326  By requiring law firms to investigate suspected mis-
conduct and take their own disciplinary action against offending attor-
neys, the legal profession can encourage firms to internalize their
ethical obligations to a greater extent than they are currently re-
quired.  The requirement would have benefits for the disciplinary pro-
cess as well.  The fact that a firm has investigated and disciplined an
attorney would not eliminate the independent duty under Rule 8.3 to
make an external report to disciplinary authorities.327  In many in-
stances, however, it might obviate the need for disciplinary authorities
to devote significant resources to their own investigation into
misconduct.
Finally, an effective compliance and ethics program would inter-
nalize systems and procedures reasonably designed to enable firm at-
torneys to practice in a competent and ethical manner.  The
comments to Rule 5.1 already reference this idea by suggesting that
firms utilize procedures “designed to detect and resolve conflicts of
interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending mat-
ters, account for client funds and property and ensure that inexperi-
enced lawyers are properly supervised.”328  At least one item in the list
needs greater emphasis: supervision of inexperienced lawyers.  Al-
though the means of supervision may vary depending upon the size
and structure of a firm, the comments should be amended to place
greater emphasis on the need for meaningful supervision and the
means by which it may be accomplished.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it is something of an embarrassment that the legal
profession does not do more to encourage firm lawyers to raise con-
cerns within their firms about suspected misconduct and protect
325. See Chambliss & Wilkins, The Emerging Role, supra note 122, at 559 (discussing the
growth in the use of in-house ethics advisors in large firms).
326. See Moberly, supra note 206, at 1144 (stating that “[s]tudies of whistleblowers
demonstrate that an even larger concern than retaliation is the fear that nothing will be
done in response to a whistleblowing complaint”).
327. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2008) (setting forth the attorney’s
ethical obligation to report the misconduct of another attorney).
328. Id. R. 5.1 cmt. 2.
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those who comply with their ethical obligations to report serious mis-
conduct to disciplinary authorities.  Although there is considerable
disparity in the law concerning the extent of protection that should be
afforded to internal versus external whistleblowers who report sus-
pected violations of the law, protection from retaliation is increasingly
viewed as vital if the goals underlying the law in question are to be
advanced.  Adverse views toward internal whistleblowers are changing
and, in many instances, the law reflects this.  In the corporate world,
there is increasing recognition that internal structures designed to fos-
ter a culture of ethical behavior and encourage employees with knowl-
edge of corporate misfeasance to share that information internally are
to be encouraged.  Yet, the legal profession, while paying lip service to
these ideas, has done little as a practical matter to advance them.
In order to provide reasonable assurance to the public at large
that law firms are places where ethics are taken seriously, the legal
profession should take steps to provide protection for lawyers who
raise reasonable, good faith concerns about possible misconduct oc-
curring within the firm.  This can be accomplished in any number of
ways.  At the most conservative level, disciplinary authorities could
simply enforce existing disciplinary rules to prohibit legal employers
from attempting to intimidate or retaliate against would-be
whistleblowers.  In terms of a holistic approach that addresses not just
the issue of retaliation against whistleblowers but the development of
meaningful ethical infrastructures within law firms, firms should be
required to establish more formal procedures for promoting the ethi-
cal practice of law, including the receipt, investigation, and resolution
of internal reports of unethical conduct.
